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Content
• This article examines theory and research examining citizens’ perceptions of media and perceptions of media effects. 
• Four research areas are highlighted: media trust/credibility perceptions, Hostile Media Perceptions, Persuasive Press 
Inference, and Third-person Perceptions.
• The psychological processes that contribute to media perceptions include selective perception, assimilation and contrast, 
and confirmation and disconfirmation biases. 
• Psychological processes involved in perceptions of media effects include selectivity, ego defensiveness/enhancement, 
negativity bias, optimistic bias, self-categorization, and stereotyping.
• Media trust and credibility are two interrelated media perceptions of crucial importance to media practitioners and media 
researchers.
• The Hostile Media Perception occurs when ideological predispositions lead individuals to perceive media bias against 
their own interests.
• The Persuasive Press Inference involves assumptions about media effects consistent with the perceived slant of media.
• Third-person Perceptions are when individuals see others as being more affected by harmful media content than they are 
themselves.
• This article examines theory and research on these perceptions, their antecedents and consequences, and offers suggestions 
for future research.
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The assertion that mass media play an important role in 
the everyday life of most people is beyond question. The 
growth of new forms of mass media (e.g., websites, blogs, 
news aggregators, social media), as well as new forms of 
message delivery (e.g., smartphones, laptops, tablets) am-
plify the presence of media in daily life. It is clear that not 
only do researchers recognize the potential effects of mass 
media, but members of the public do as well. In fact, refer-
ences to the power of mass media are plentiful in both media 
and public discourse. Researchers and the public alike are 
interested in, and concerned about, the mass media as a 
potentially influential force in social and political life. 
As such, it is not surprising that research on media effects 
has flourished in communication and related disciplines like 
psychology, sociology and political science. Not only have 
researchers studied the impact of mass media, but they have 
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also conducted research on the impact that perceptions of 
media effects have. Questions have been asked regarding 
how people perceive mass media, how powerful they believe 
media effects to be, and what the consequences of such per-
ceptions are. Research on perceptions of media and media 
effects has been predominantly, though not exclusively, un-
dertaken by American scholars using U.S. samples. Research 
in this area tends to draw from social-psychological theories 
and is methodologically quantitative, and the unit of analy-
sis is typically done on a micro-level.
The research that we review in the area of media percep-
tion research, such as the Hostile Media and the Third-Per-
son phenomena, have been extremely fruitful lines of 
communication research in the past several decades. How-
ever, despite their similar psychological underpinnings and 
the fact that they are to some degree consequentially related, 
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Media Perception Concepts and Processes
Before we discuss research and theory on media percep-
tions, it is important to address some of the basic psycho-
logical concepts and processes involved in developing media 
perceptions. Perception is a central concept of social research, 
as theorists have long recognized that “reality” is in the mind 
of the observer. That is, it is important to understand how 
individuals perceive the world, as conditioned by their past 
experiences and predispositions, including potential patterns, 
stereotypes, biases, and distortions in those perceptions. The 
focus of the research reviewed in this article is on the nature 
of people’s perceptions of the media, and the effects that 
result from exposure to media content. Because this research 
focuses on perceptions, it is also concerned with the various 
factors that shape these perceptions. In terms of the nature 
of the perceived effects being examined, this research has 
included effects on knowledge, attitudes and behaviors, and 
has been extended to the perceived effects of both news and 
entertainment media.
The most basic concept involved in media perception 
research is in fact, “the media.” The term, “the media” seem-
ingly comes up as frequently in public and media discourse 
as it does in the conversations of experts who study the me-
dia. Notably, members of the public, politicians, journalists, 
they are often studied in isolation from each other when in 
fact they may have reciprocal consequences for each other. 
For example, the perception that the media are hostile to 
one’s interests may motivate greater concern about their 
potential effects on others, while concern for effects on oth-
ers may also foster the perception that the media are hostile. 
Our comprehensive review seeks to enhance the theoretical 
integration of the various strands of research that examine 
perceptions of media and their effects by highlighting their 
psychological underpinnings and extending interrelation-
ships. In the process, we identify areas where research can 
be expanded.
In this review, we address the current state of theory and 
research on media perceptions and perceptions of media 
effects (see Figure 1 for a visual overview of the scope of this 
review). We begin by examining the psychological concepts 
and processes involved in generating media perceptions. We 
then proceed to discuss the mass communication research 
that has explored various forms of media perceptions and 
their consequences. These perceptions include media trust 
and credibility, and a media bias perception known as the 
Hostile Media Perception. We then move on to address re-
search that deals with perceptions of media effects and their 
consequences, including the Persuasive Press Inference and 
the Third-person Perception. 
Figure 1. Media Perceptions and Media Effects Perceptions. (Back to pg. 55, pg. 68, pg. 70)
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differences between local, national, and international media 
organizations. And within those categories, significant dif-
ferences can be observed (e.g., The New York Times versus The 
Wall Street Journal, or MSNBC versus Fox News). At a closer 
level, newspapers stories differ from each other markedly, 
just as television shows or movies differ from each other. 
Thus, when people make statements about the media, or 
when researchers ask them to render an opinion regarding 
the media, gross generalizations are being made that do not 
apply equally well to the various corners of the media mono-
lith. 
The above paragraph identifies a distinction that is par-
ticularly important for communication researchers studying 
media perceptions and perceptions of media effects: the no-
tion that there are different levels of media involved (i.e., 
media as a whole, mediums such as newspaper and television, 
media organizations, types of media content such as news, 
genre within content type, and particular media messages). 
In our examination of the research on media and effects 
perceptions, we found that across the literature, studies dif-
fered in terms of the level on which they focus. Two points 
can be made here. First, it is important to keep this distinc-
tion between different media levels in mind when surveying 
the literature. Second, future research may want to explore 
how media perceptions and perceived effects are influenced 
by the nature of the media level in question.
Given all of the differences that exist within the media, 
it is not surprising that individuals view media very differ-
ently, with fairly obvious differences in judgments attribut-
able to factors like political ideology, social class, race, and 
gender. However, individuals may differ when observed at 
different points in time depending on factors like recent ex-
posure to a particular medium or being primed to think about 
a particular subset of media. Moreover, differences in media 
diets may lead individuals to differ in their perceptions of 
media. For example, heavy users of television news may see 
the media very differently than heavy newspaper readers. 
There is ample evidence to show that people are very selective 
in the media that they choose to use. There is some evidence 
that individual differences in media use lead individuals to 
develop different perceptions of the media based on a differ-
ent set of media experiences (Oh, Park, & Wanta, 2011). Also, 
individual selectivity in terms of exposure and attention in 
accordance with different predispositions and gratifications 
sought introduce further variance in media perceptions (Iy-
engar & Hahn, 2009; Ponder & Haridakis, 2015; Stroud, 
and even media researchers often make the mistake of using 
media as a singular noun, as witnessed by the common use 
of the phrase, “The media is….”  This phrase reflects a ten-
dency by all of these groups to lump the multi-faceted mon-
strosity that constitutes the media into a monolithic entity. 
When citizens use the terms, the “liberal” media or the “con-
servative” media, they are making generalizations that do 
not apply to all or even most media. Similarly, when indi-
viduals make claims about how violent, sexist, or racist the 
media are, they are making stereotyped judgments that do 
not apply equally to all media, much less to all journalists. 
But people make stereotyped judgments about collectives 
(e.g., groups organizations or people) all the time. Walter 
Lippmann famously recognized that it is a common and 
natural occurrence to see the world through simplified ste-
reotypes that have heuristic value in everyday life, but pro-
vide only partial understandings of reality (Lippmann, 1922). 
Such is the case when we use the term, “the media,” wheth-
er we are citizens, politicians, journalists, or media research-
ers.
As media researchers, we often recognize that when 
citizens, politicians or journalists refer to “the media,” they 
are making generalizations that gloss over a lot of important 
distinctions and differences between media. However, as 
media researchers, we frequently pose questions to the sub-
jects we study that require respondents to make generaliza-
tions based on stereotyped perceptions of a monolithic media. 
Whether in the realm of public discourse, or in the realm of 
media research, it is important to recognize that the media 
are not monolithic. They differ in important ways. First, 
there are obvious differences between media based on the 
functions they serve such as news and entertainment. And 
while many individuals have rightly observed that the bound-
aries between news and information have increasingly 
blurred into “infotainment,” there is considerable variance 
in media messages and effects across broad content domains. 
Moreover, there are significant differences within those con-
tent domains. There are also meaningful differences by me-
dium, as reflected in the differences in the nature of content 
among movies, books, television, radio, newspapers, and so 
forth. And again, though some of the media may be exhibit-
ing characteristics of media convergence, their differences 
remain stark. Moreover, new media (e.g., the Internet, social 
media, blogs, mobile apps, etc.) have added to the variegation 
of media forms. Even within specific types of media such as 
newspapers or television, there are often numerous notable 
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tions of those targets may become distorted. When a target 
falls within their latitude of acceptance, there is a tendency 
to see the target as more similar than it really is (assimilation), 
and when the target falls into the latitude of rejection, the 
target is often perceived as more different than it really is 
(contrast). By applying Social Judgment Theory to media 
perceptions, we might expect assimilation and contrast ef-
fects. For instance, when it comes to judging a conservative 
news organization like Fox News, conservatives may experi-
ence assimilation and perceive the network and its news 
stories as being more similar to their ideology than they re-
ally are. Similarly, liberals may be subject to contrast effects 
and see Fox News as being more consistently conservative 
than it really is. Sherif and Sherif (1967) also note that indi-
viduals who are very ego-involved for the issue in question 
tend to have a smaller latitude of acceptance. For media 
perceptions, this might mean that ego-involved people judge 
media organizations and news stories as being more different 
from their own preferences than they really are. 
Another process related to media perceptions is the “con-
firmation bias,” in which individuals engage in processes to 
seek, perceive, and recall information in a way that supports 
their predispositions (Plous, 1993). Such a phenomenon 
might help explain the persistence of false beliefs such as the 
common tendency among staunch conservatives to believe 
that President Obama is a Muslim and was born outside the 
United States. Such confirmation biases may cause people 
to use media that are likely to support their viewpoints, and 
even to construct memories of mediated reports that confirm 
their viewpoints, such as when 2016 Republican presidential 
primary candidates Donald Trump and Ben Carson claimed 
to have seen media reports of Muslims in New Jersey cele-
brating the 9/11 terrorist attacks, despite the fact that media 
have not been able to confirm that such videos actually exist. 
A “disconfirmation bias” may also affect how media 
reports are perceived. Disconfirmation bias is when people 
resist or discount information that conflicts with their pre-
dispositions, such as when individuals deny overwhelming 
evidence of global warming. Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) 
observed confirmation and disconfirmation biases when they 
presented pro- and anti-death penalty respondents with two 
conflicting studies on the deterrence effects of capital punish-
ment. The respondents rated studies that had findings con-
sistent with their viewpoint as being more valid and 
convincing than studies that were counter to their viewpoint. 
When applied to media perceptions, confirmation and 
2008, Stroud 2010).
However, it is not just differences in media experiences 
that lead to variation in media perceptions. Researchers have 
also identified various psychological processes that introduce 
biases into the development of media perceptions. One ma-
jor source of variation is selective perception, a form of per-
ception bias in which individuals’ predispositions influence 
the way that they see the world. Research on selective percep-
tion has shown it to be robust and powerful form of biased 
perceptions that applies to a wide range of perceptual phe-
nomena, including perceptions of media and media content. 
In a classic study of selective perception, Hastorf and Cantril 
(1954) distributed a questionnaire to students at Dartmouth 
and Princeton to assess their perceptions of a game that was 
played between the football teams of the two schools in 1951. 
Not surprisingly, the respondents saw the game very differ-
ently in terms of which team was responsible for what both 
sides saw as a rough and dirty game. Princeton students put 
the blame on Dartmouth and vice versa. Moreover, when 
students from both schools were asked to watch a movie of 
the game and identify infractions, Princeton students re-
ported many more infractions by the Dartmouth team and 
saw those infractions as being more flagrant. The Dartmouth 
students who watched the same game film saw it very dif-
ferently in light of their allegiance to Dartmouth. While 
selective perception has been widely recognized by media 
researchers, its most directly relevant application to percep-
tions of the media has been in the area of the Hostile Media 
Perceptions, discussed below. 
Social Judgment Theory (Hovland & Sherif, 1980) sug-
gests another potential source of perceptual bias relevant to 
media perceptions. This theory maintains that individual 
perceptions are developed in the context of attitudinal pre-
dispositions. When individuals are called upon to render a 
judgment about a construct (i.e., a judgment target such as 
an object or idea; in the case of media perceptions, the judg-
ment target might be the media, a news organization, a jour-
nalist, or a news story), they assess the target relative to the 
structure of their existing relevant attitudes. Social Judgment 
Theory proposes that the structure of relevant attitudes con-
stitute three potential zones in which the judgment object 
may be placed: the “latitude of acceptance” (a range of ac-
ceptable ideas), the “latitude of rejection” (a range of unac-
ceptable ideas), and the “latitude of non-commitment” (a 
range that represents ideas that are neither acceptable or 
unacceptable). When individuals make judgments, percep-
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press among the American public since the mid-to-late 1900s 
(Gronke & Cook, 2007; Ladd, 2011). For example, the Gen-
eral Social Survey found in 1973 that just 14.4% of respon-
dents had “hardly any” confidence in the press, while 22.7% 
had a “great deal” of confidence. By 2012, 46% reported 
hardly any confidence and just 8.8% reported a great deal of 
confidence (Smith & Son, 2013). Gallup periodically asks 
American citizens how much trust and confidence they have 
that the news media report “the news fully, accurately, and 
fairly.” In 1972, 18% reported a “great deal” of trust and 
confidence and 50% a fair amount. In 2014, the findings were 
10% and 30%, respectively. In 1972, a scant 6% reported they 
had no trust or confidence at all, while in 2014 that figure 
rose to a high of 24%. The press fares poorly among the 
public in European countries as well, with one analysis show-
ing that citizens in Great Britain, France, Germany and 
Spain expressed less confidence in the news media in 1987 
than did Americans (Parisot, 1988), while those in China 
show higher levels of media trust (Liu & Bates, 2009).
Highlighting the importance of this area of study, a Web 
of Science search presented in Table 1 revealed there were at 
least 95 peer-reviewed journal articles published regarding 
news media trust or credibility since 1990, with interest grow-
ing in more recent years. While a good portion of the research 
focuses on U.S. media, research in international contexts is 
robust and becoming increasingly common. 
Factors shaping perceptions of media 
trustworthiness and credibility.
Certainly, some of the blame for the increasingly negative 
perceptions may lie at the feet of the news media themselves. 
Reports of plagiarism, fabrication, and embellishment by 
award-winning journalists like Jayson Blair, Stephen Glass, 
Jonah Lehrer, and Brian Williams that escaped fact-checkers; 
networks relying on faulty exit-polling data to miscall the 
2000 U.S. presidential election; and the recent phone-hack-
ing scandal involving British tabloids (see Bucy, D’Angelo, 
& Bauer, 2014) are but a few examples in which news media 
clearly fell short of the public’s expectations. Outside of these 
egregious failings, however, are relatively commonplace and 
accepted journalistic practices that contribute to distrust in 
the press, including the use of anonymous sources (Pjesivac 
& Rui, 2014) and “game framing,” in which political issues 
are treated as strategic contests (Hopmann, Shehata, & 
Stromback, 2015; see Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). 
disconfirmation biases are similar to selective perception. 
They all affect how people perceive media, leading them to 
seek, interpret, and remember information that confirms 
their beliefs about the media, and to avoid, attack, and forget 
that which conflicts with their orientation toward the media, 
whether those orientations pertain to individual journalists, 
news stories, media organizations, or media as a whole. 
Selective perception, contrast, and disconfirmation pro-
cesses may work together to, not only bias media perceptions 
(i.e., distorting perceptions of the media organizations and 
the content they produce), but also to produce perceptions 
that the media are biased (i.e., contributing to more long-
term, resilient and global perceptions regarding the media 
monolith). Conservatives tend to see the media has having 
a liberal bias, while liberals are likely to see the media as 
having a conservative bias. These perceptions have become 
reified through continued references and use in the culture. 
For instance, we hear terms like the “liberal media” and the 
“lamestream media” repeated so often that they become 
culturally accepted as true, particularly to those for whom 
such labels are a match with their predispositions. To the 
extent that these constructs become reified, it is not just the 
predispositions of individuals that color media perceptions 
(through selectivity and contrast processes), it is the existence 
of the reified constructs themselves that shape subsequent 
perceptions and judgments. With these basic principles in 
mind, we now turn to a discussion of specific theory and 
research that deals with media perceptions and their subse-
quent effects.
Media Perceptions and Effects of Media 
Perceptions
In this section, we review media perceptions and their 
consequences, including media trust and credibility percep-
tions (grouped together because research has shown them to 
be highly intertwined), and media bias perceptions as exem-
plified by research on the Hostile Media Perception.
Media Trust and Credibility Perceptions and 
Effects.
A troubling trend for news media scholars and practitio-
ners has been an increasingly negative attitude toward the 
McLeod, Wise, & Perryman
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2012). Through interviews with survivors of Hurricane Ka-
trina, research by Voorhees, Vick, and Perkins (2007) found 
that some interviewees thought that news accounts were 
exaggerated, overly negative, inaccurate or did not match 
their own experiences or the experiences of their acquain-
tances.
Additionally, negative political coverage can lead to distrust 
of news media (Sabato, 1993; Fallows, 1996). Experimental 
research has shown that even a host’s tone can impact cred-
ibility judgments, with hosts taking a more serious, civil tone, 
seen as more credible than those with a combative or humor-
ous tone (Vraga, Edgerly, Bode, Carr, Bard, Johnson, & Shah, 
Table 1. Number of research articles by year (Web of Science).
Media Trust and 
Credibility
Hostile Media 
Perception and 
Effects
Persuasive Press 
Inference
Third-person 
Perception and Effects
Year
1992 2
1993 3 2
1994 1
1995 6
1996 7
1997 1 5
1998 1 1 6
1999 1 1 9
2000 2 6
2001 1 2 2 7
2002 3 2 5
2003 3 3 1 5
2004 3 2 7
2005 3 2 1 10
2006 6 2 6
2007 6 4 1 14
2008 3 4 1 29
2009 7 2 1 9
2010 7 2 9
2011 8 7 12
2012 13 5 9
2013 7 3 10
2014 12 5 12
2015 8 8 1 13
TOTAL 95 57 13 200
[1] The publication trend data displayed in Table 1 were collected using the Web of Science database using the all 
databases option. Results were constrained to the period from 1990 through 2015. Searches were conducted for the 
following four areas: Media Trust and Credibility (search: “media trust,” and “media credibility”), Hostile Media 
Perception and Effects (search: “hostile media perception”), Third-Person Perceptions and Effects (search: “third-
person perception”), and Persuasive Press Inference (search: “persuasive press inference”). (Back to pg. 46, pg. 54, 
pg. 59. pg. 70)
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ity, while ethnic minorities found international news media 
to be more credible. Beaudoin and Thorson (2005) observed 
that African-Americans perceived news coverage of African-
Americans as less credible than news coverage of other 
groups. There is also evidence that increased religiosity-
-depending on how it is measured--is associated with perceiv-
ing newspaper and television news media as less trustworthy 
or credible (Golan & Day, 2010). 
It is important to note that the findings above relate large-
ly to the mainstream news media monolith. Perceptions of 
news media credibility and trustworthiness can vary greatly 
by type of medium and the specific outlets being rated. For 
example, Americans express more confidence in local news-
papers and television than “the press” in general, and declines 
in confidence ratings have been much less steep in the former 
than the latter (Gronke & Cook, 2007). In a study of Chinese 
media, television was also found to be the most credible 
(Zhang, Zhou, & Shen, 2014). There have also been differ-
ences observed with respect to the trustworthiness of media 
outlets when they are online versus their original medium. 
For example, politically interested Internet users during the 
1996 presidential campaign rated the online version of news-
papers higher than the print version, but did not rate the 
online versions of newsmagazines higher than the print ver-
sion (Johnson & Kaye, 1998). In a follow-up study, Johnson 
and Kaye (2010) found a different pattern of credibility rat-
ings among politically interested respondents for online and 
traditional sources during the 2004 election. Online televi-
sion news sources were viewed as more credible, while online 
radio news sources and online news magazines were viewed 
as less credible. There was no difference in credibility percep-
tions found in 2004 between online and printed newspapers. 
When specific sources are considered, trust varies wide-
ly. In a Pew Research Center study, Mitchell, Gottfried, 
Kiley, and Matsa (2014) found The Economist, the BBC, NPR, 
PBS, The Wall Street Journal and the major U.S. television 
news networks to be among the most trusted sources among 
Americans; while Buzzfeed, The Rush Limbaugh Show, The 
Glenn Beck Program, The Ed Schultz Show, Al Jazeera 
America, The Sean Hannity Show, and Daily Kos to be the 
least trusted. When broken down by respondents’ political 
ideology, conservatives were different from liberals such that 
all of those in the above list of trusted news sources, except 
for the Wall Street Journal, were distrusted by those categorized 
as consistent conservatives, while the same group expressed 
trust in conservative-leaning outlets like FOX News, The 
But other factors beyond the control of individual report-
ers and media organizations can also shape perceptions of 
news media trustworthiness and credibility. In Ladd’s (2011) 
examination of the U.S news media, he found trust was 
highest during the 1950s through 1970s, a time of low eco-
nomic competition among news outlets that allowed journal-
ists to pursue serious investigative journalism. When 
economic competition increased, Ladd (2011) notes there 
was an increased focus on soft news to draw audiences from 
entertainment and alternative media, with the resulting de-
cline in quality journalism leading the public to hold the 
profession in lower esteem. Additionally, Ladd (2011) found 
that ratings of news media decline during times of increased 
political polarization, when elite criticism of mainstream 
news media is more commonplace. Cappella and Jamieson 
(1997) have found indirect evidence that elite criticism of 
mainstream media in conservative political talk program-
ming may lead to increased distrust among its audiences. 
Moreover, national political structure can interact with pri-
vate versus state media ownership to affect judgments of 
news media credibility, with those in non-democratic societ-
ies trusting state-owned television media the least (Tsfati & 
Ariely, 2014). However, research in China found official state 
media to be perceived as highly credible (Zhang, Zhou, & 
Shen, 2014).
A bevy of individual-level factors are also related to per-
ceptions of news media trust and credibility. Older people 
(Bucy, 2003), men (Johnson & Kaye, 2009; Choi, Watt, & 
Lynch, 2006), the more educated (Mulder, 1981), and those 
with conservative ideology and Republican Party identifica-
tion, particularly those who listen to talk radio (Gronke & 
Cook, 2007; Jones 2004), tend to have less trust or confidence 
in news media. Those with high levels of interpersonal trust 
and the politically interested tend to have more trust in news 
media (Tsfati & Ariely, 2014). Media skepticism can interact 
with political cynicism to lead people to view alternatives to 
mainstream news, such as citizen journalism, to be more 
credible (Carr, Barnidge, Lee, & Tsang 2014). Choi, Watt, 
and Lynch (2006) also found partisan differences in the per-
ceived credibility of Internet news sources during the Iraq 
War. Results revealed partisan differences in perceived cred-
ibility of television news, with critics of the war seeing news 
as being less credible than supporters. Race and ethnicity 
can also affect trust in media. Shim, Golan, Day, and Yang 
(2015) found that ethnic minorities in Pakistan perceived 
local television to be less credible than did the Punjabi major-
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zations and reporters to do their jobs. Bucy, D’Angelo, and 
Bauer (2014) suggest public distrust in news media could 
disrupt the power balance between the media and other pow-
erful institutions, and put the media under more scrutiny, 
leading the press to be less aggressive in its coverage. While 
Americans support the watchdog role of journalism, news 
media distrust could lead people to believe the press has too 
much freedom and that they abuse the freedoms they have 
(Gaziano & McGrath, 1986). Consequently, citizens may 
increasingly support government regulation of the press, 
such as licensing for reporters, fines for inaccuracy or bias, 
and requirements for balanced reporting (Smith & Lichter, 
1997).
Of concern to many scholars is the tendency for those low 
in media trust to also be less trusting of government. Trust 
in the press and in government institutions in America have 
both seen similar declines over the decades, leading some to 
question whether the drop in both is a symptom of a more 
general dissatisfaction with socio-political institutions or 
whether there is a causal link between the two. An analysis 
by Gronke and Cook (2007) of General Social Survey data 
from 1973 through 2004, however, found that strong parti-
sans, those whose party was in power, the more religious, 
and those with rising incomes are skeptical of the press while 
more supportive of other American institutions. This finding 
led the authors to suggest there are distinct factors at play in 
shaping perceptions of each. Gronke and Cook (2007) fur-
thermore note that perceptions of media credibility follow a 
pattern observed when the American public is quizzed about 
its attitudes toward Congress. Just as people disdain Con-
gress as an institution, they generally view the representatives 
from their districts in a positive light. Similarly, when it 
comes to perceptions of the news media, people give the press 
in general low marks, while expressing satisfaction about the 
media they use often. This bifurcation raises methodological 
concerns in studies of media trust that we will address later 
in this article. 
Future directions for media trust and credibility 
research.
As shown above, studies have examined attitudes about 
the news media or the press in general, have focused on 
comparisons between different media types, and have in-
cluded more granular examinations of individual media 
outlets and journalists. There is certainly a case to be made 
Blaze, Breitbart, and programs with conservative hosts. 
Those categorized as consistent liberals, on the other hand, 
tended to trust more than they distrusted all media sources 
they were asked about, save for sources with conservative 
leanings. 
Consequences of media trust and credibility 
perceptions.
Perceptions of news media trust and credibility can play 
a role in attenuating or amplifying media effects. Tsfati 
(2003a) found those low in media trust are less likely to agree 
with the climate of public opinion presented in news cover-
age, which he suggested could have implications for media 
effects such as the spiral of silence that rely on people’s per-
ceptions of what others think. News media trust moderates 
agenda-setting effects, with those higher in media trust more 
likely to share issue priorities that align with the media 
agenda (Miller & Krosnick, 2000; Tsfati, 2003b). Experi-
mental research has also shown media priming effects to be 
amplified by media trust, with those high in media trust most 
likely to apply criteria made salient in media coverage in 
their judgment of attitude objects (Miller & Krosnick, 2000). 
Media trust can also affect the extent to which people learn 
from the news (Ladd, 2011).
There is some concern that distrust of news media could 
drive people to tune out. Indeed, Tsfati and Cappella (2003) 
found that those skeptical of mainstream news media tend 
to gravitate more heavily to Internet sources and political 
talk radio. They note, however, the association between trust 
and exposure is modest, and “even the most skeptical audi-
ence members watch the national and local news on televi-
sion and read the daily newspaper” (p. 518), and skeptics 
tend to consume more mainstream media than they do al-
ternatives. There is some evidence that attention paid to 
different forms of news media can vary in distinct ways de-
pending on the locus of trust. For example, Williams (2012) 
found that increased trust in those delivering the news, such 
as reporters, was related to increased newspaper attention, 
while increased trust in news organizations was related only 
to increased television news attention. Williams’ findings 
illustrate the value in taking a more fine-grained approach 
to examining the relationship between different forms of 
media trust and attention to news media. 
The public’s trust in news media and perceptions about 
their credibility could also affect the ability of news organi-
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er items, including caring about what the audience thinks, 
sensationalism, and morality, grouped together to form a 
social concerns factor. The Gaziano and McGrath (1986) 
index underwent further refinement through the work of 
Meyer (1988), who raised questions about the face validity 
of some of the items in the index as well as a lack of an ex-
plicit connection to prior theory. Meyer’s (1988) work re-
sulted in a 5-item “believability” index, that asks whether 
respondents believe the press is “fair,” “unbiased,” tells the 
“whole story,” is “accurate,” and “can be trusted”; and a 
4-item “affiliation” index that asks whether the press “watch-
es out after your interests,” is “concerned about the com-
munity’s well-being,” is “patriotic,” and is “concerned 
mainly about the public interest” (pp. 573-574). While these 
measures certainly represent an improvement over single-
item measures, such as confidence in the press, they still have 
received criticism for not being linked to higher-level theory. 
In the indexes above, trustworthiness is intertwined with 
credibility, with credibility being treated as the higher-order 
concept. Other work, however, has taken an approach in 
which trust is the higher-order concept--of which credibility 
is a component--and have linked media trust to sociological 
theories on interpersonal and institutional trust (Tsfati & 
Cappella, 2003; Kohring & Matthes, 2007; Williams, 2012). 
Using data collected in Germany, Kohring and Matthes 
(2007) found media trust to be a multidimensional construct 
composed of an individual’s trust in the news media’s “se-
lectivity of topics,” “selectivity of facts,” “accuracy of depic-
tions,” and “journalistic assessment.” The connection to a 
broader theory of trust is certainly an advancement that could 
help situate findings regarding perceptions of media within 
sociological theory, but more work must be done to validate 
the Kohring and Matthes (2007) measurement instrument 
in contexts outside of Germany. At the present, media cred-
ibility work appears dominant in the U.S, while scholarship 
examining media trust is more evident in work by scholars 
outside the U.S. (Hellmueller, 2012). The ability for scholars 
to confidently draw on both traditions to make observations 
and inferences related to perceptions of media performance 
would be greatly enhanced by work to both distinguish and 
unify these approaches.
Moreover, while the factor-analytic approach to uncover-
ing the components of news media credibility or trust has 
increased understanding of these concepts, scholars would 
do well to heed the concern raised by Cronkhite and Liska 
(1976) that dimensions underlying ratings may be affected 
for different approaches to meet the needs of any given study. 
However, scholars must consider the limitations of each ap-
proach and design survey instruments accordingly. In an era 
in which news media choices are greatly expanded, it is un-
known what a given respondent considers the news media, 
the press, the mainstream new media or even newspapers, 
television, radio, or the Internet to actually be. When people 
are asked questions about trust and credibility, what consti-
tutes the media that they use as the basis for judgment? Are 
the attitudes expressed related to the media they prefer to 
consume or related to those which they do not? Do the at-
titudes reflect a judgment about a specific outlet or journal-
ist they have recently been exposed to, or a lifetime of 
experience consuming media? Are the attitudes respondents 
express related to the news they are exposed to directly or 
those which they have been told about by others? Do the 
attitudes relate to global, national, or local news media? Are 
judgments related to those delivering straight news content, 
or are opinion sources also included? Survey questions, there-
fore, should be designed in such a way to reduce uncertainty 
as to what individuals being surveyed are responding. 
The astute reader will note that in our discussion of news 
media trust and credibility we have yet to explicitly define 
these terms. The reason is straightforward—there exists no 
universally agreed upon definitions or measures for these 
concepts, and they have often been referred to interchange-
ably in the research (Hellmueller & Trilling, 2012). A com-
prehensive review of the various definitions and measures 
used by scholars, research organizations, and media firms 
is beyond the scope of this article, but we will highlight some 
examples to demonstrate the need for further development 
in this area.
In their influential work on news media credibility the 
1950s, Carl Hovland and the Yale Communication Research 
Group defined credibility as expertise and trustworthiness. 
In later research, Gaziano and McGrath (1986) conducted 
a factor analysis of survey responses collected as part of an 
American Society of Newspaper Editors study and found 
answers to 12 of 16 questions about perceptions of media 
performance grouped together to form a credibility factor. 
These questions concerned fairness, bias, completeness, ac-
curacy, respect for privacy, watching out for the audience’s 
interests, concern about community wellbeing, whether the 
news is factual or opinionated, whether fact and opinion are 
separated, trustworthiness, concern with public interest over 
profits, and whether reporters were trained well. Three oth-
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and measuring media bias. Researchers who have explored 
bias in news have typically measured the fairness and balance 
of articles by looking at the attention and prominence given 
to positions on either side of an issue (Fico & Freedman, 
2008). More recently, researchers have turned their attention 
to examining audience perception of media bias, which 
largely sidesteps the problem of defining and measuring con-
tent bias. Nevertheless, research on media perceptions has 
expanded over the past three decades. 
Studies of the Hostile Media Perception (HMP) have been 
the most visible body of research examining news media bias 
perceptions. Our analysis of the literature on the HMP shows 
that articles on the HMP (see Table 1) have been increasing 
in frequency since 2000. This research is grounded in the 
long-standing literature on selective perception. 
Following the tradition of Hastorf and Cantril’s (1954) 
research on distorted perceptions of the Princeton/Dart-
mouth football game, Vallone, Ross, and Lepper (1985) ap-
plied the selective perception logic to examine perceptions 
of news coverage of political issues. Similar to the way the 
college partisans saw a different reality when watching a 
football game, these researchers posited a “Hostile Media 
Effect” (HME) in which political partisans see news coverage 
differently from one another. The authors reported on the 
results of two studies conducted in very different contexts. 
First, their telephone survey conducted three days before the 
1980 presidential election showed differences in judgments 
of news coverage between the supporters of Ronald Reagan 
and Jimmy Carter when asked about the bias of news media 
in general. Results, which are none too surprisingly in today’s 
relatively charged partisan environment, showed that 90% 
of the people who thought that media coverage had been 
biased believed that it was biased against their own candi-
date. However, such partisan differences were diminished 
when respondents were asked about their perception of bias 
in specific newspaper and magazine articles.
Vallone, Ross, and Lepper (1985) also reported results of 
another study of pro-Arab and pro-Israeli students, which 
found that both groups perceived television news coverage 
as being biased in favor of the other side in coverage of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. These two studies support the notion 
that media perceptions, operating through the processes of 
selective perception and contrast processes, follow the hostile 
media pattern in which individuals view media content as 
being hostile to their own viewpoint. In the case of the media 
coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict, non-partisan students 
by-- among other factors--time, topic, and context. It is, there-
fore, imperative for those developing indices to test them 
across a variety of contexts and topics, and perhaps develop 
custom indices sensitive to them.
Hostile Media Perceptions and Effects.
Media bias is a perception that is related to perceptions 
of news media trust and credibility. Individuals who are low 
in perceived media trust and credibility are more likely to 
perceive the media as being biased. Similarly, individuals 
who perceive the news media to be biased are likely to ques-
tion the credibility of the media as well as express media 
distrust. Such relationships are likely to be observed for per-
ceptions of the media generally, as well as for specific news 
organizations and individual journalists. However, because 
research on bias perceptions, frequently conducted under the 
rubric of the Hostile Media Perception, has been more con-
ceptually distinct, we review that research separately from 
trust and credibility perceptions.
As public concerns about news media bias have been 
around for a long time, so too have researchers been inter-
ested in studying media bias. For many decades, researchers 
were concerned with revealing patterns of bias in media 
content. This task has proven to be notoriously difficult as 
it is virtually impossible to objectively define what reality is, 
and thus impossible to define what an objective representa-
tion of reality is. Journalists themselves struggle with how 
to eliminate bias in news coverage. Objectivity in news, as 
in reality, has been shown to be socially constructed (Tuch-
man, 1980). Journalists have long wrestled with defining 
objectivity in trying to cover the “reality” of real-world events 
and issues. Instead, they have adopted rituals (Tuchman, 
1978) like news formats and the reliance on official sources. 
They frequently cover stories by attempting to balance con-
tending perspectives in the practice of “this side said/that 
side said” journalism while abdicating much of the respon-
sibility of declaring which side’s arguments carry more 
weight (Pingree, Brossard, & McLeod, 2014).
Given that journalists have largely sidestepped the issue 
of defining bias by creating objectivity rituals, it is not sur-
prising that media researchers have also struggled with news 
media bias. Social scientific approaches to the study of media 
bias have had a hard time establishing what an objective 
news story is and therefore have a have a hard time isolating 
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Schmitt, 2004), Israeli settlements in Gaza (Tsfati & Cohen, 
2005b), climate change (Kim, 2011), immigration (Watson 
& Riffe, 2013), same-sex marriage (Kim, 2015), and many 
others. 
Most often, these studies ask respondents to react to news 
coverage that is more or less neutral. However, studies that 
use articles that are biased in a particular direction find a 
similar pattern of differences in perceptions between partisan 
groups, only the perceptions of both groups move in the di-
rection of the bias, a shift that reflects what has been called 
a “relative” HMP (Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 
2001). The notion of the relative HMP would explain why 
strong conservative partisans might admit that Rush Lim-
baugh has a conservative bent, but would see him as being 
relatively fair and balanced in comparison to liberal parti-
sans.
Perloff (2015) discusses the nature of the linkage between 
partisanship and the HMP, identifying three theoretical ex-
planations: social identification, involvement and the influ-
ence of pre-existing values, favoring the latter as his preferred 
explanation. He argues that, not only is this a more parsi-
monious explanation, it also links to Social Judgment The-
ory through the contrast effect that results from information 
that falls within the latitude of rejection of political partisans. 
Researchers have suggested a number of different mediat-
ing processes that might account for the HMP. Schmitt, 
Gunther, and Liebhart (2004) identified that differences in 
news media perceptions might be accounted for by differ-
ences in the way partisans selectively recall information, 
differences in their content judgments, and differences in 
their evaluation standards. They compared these competing 
explanations in research conducted in the context of the 
controversy over genetically modified foods. The results 
indicated that partisans from each side were making differ-
ent judgments regarding the same content. Perloff (2015) 
notes an additional mediating factor--prior beliefs about news 
media bias that may come into play when individuals are 
asked to make judgments about media bias. To be sure, there 
are popular views regarding news bias on both sides of the 
political spectrum. The term “liberal media” is quite popular 
among conservatives. Similarly, liberals contend that the 
media inherently support conservative interests of corpora-
tions. This explanation holds that HMP occurs as a result of 
the tendency for partisans to be more likely to employ these 
pervasive social constructs in their judgments.
saw the coverage as being relatively neutral. The upshot of 
the HMP is that partisans see mainstream news media as 
biased, not only as biased against their viewpoint, but biased, 
period. It explains why American conservatives are so pas-
sionate in their indictment of the liberal media, while at the 
same time, liberals, perhaps less vocally, see the mainstream 
media as having a conservative bias.
Perloff (2015) notes that the results of the Vallone, Ross, 
and Lepper (1985) study ran counter to the research at the 
time, which focused on selective perception that led to the 
assimilation of information, such as Lord, Ross, and Lepper’s 
(1979) study that showed individuals interpreted research on 
capital punishment as supporting their own position. How-
ever, there is a key difference between this research and the 
HMP research, which exhibits a contrast effect of selective 
perception. That is, in the assimilation research, respondents 
were engaging in selective perception of reality as they in-
terpreted the findings of research studies, whereas in studies 
of the HMP, respondents are responding to what they see as 
journalists’ distorted representations of reality. Thus, we 
might reconcile the two studies by Lepper and his colleagues 
in several ways. First, assimilation effects may occur when 
we process research findings and contrast effects may occur 
for perceptions of the story as a whole, especially if we see 
the former as reality and the latter as an interpretation of 
reality (recognizing the limits of journalistic objectivity). 
Second, from the perspective of Social Judgment Theory, we 
may have a wider latitude of acceptance for research reports 
leading to assimilation effects and a wider latitude for rejec-
tion for news stories leading to contrast effects. Finally, con-
trast judgments appear when individuals judge messages 
perceived as reaching beyond themselves. News stories may 
cue thoughts of how a message may impact vulnerable oth-
ers in the audience, triggering a defensive processing strat-
egy (Gunther, Miller, & Liebhart, 2009). 
Since the Vallone, Ross, and Lepper (1985) study, the 
HMP has been replicated by a host of other studies. For 
example, Perloff (1989) and Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken (1993) 
found supportive evidence in a similar content context--Mid-
dle East conflict. Subsequent research has extended the HMP 
to other news coverage contexts such as presidential elections 
(Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998), primate research (Gun-
ther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 2001), physician-assisted 
suicide (Gunther & Christen, 2002), labor strikes (Christen, 
Kannaovakun, & Gunther, 2002), sports reporting (Arpan 
& Raney, 2003), genetically modified foods (Gunther & 
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sage content. By contrast, low-involvement individuals make 
judgments based on heuristic shortcuts using peripheral cues. 
The findings of HMP research violate this expectation in 
two respects. First, high-involvement partisans perceive 
relatively neutral messages as being biased indicating that 
they are engaging in less systematic processing. Second, the 
fact that high-involvement partisans are more influenced by 
partisan cues reflects the influence of simpler, heuristic judg-
ments. As such, there seems to be a disconnect between 
ELM/HSM theories and the findings of HMP research.
Other studies have broadened the scope of the hostile 
media phenomenon. For example, Richardson, Huddy, and 
Morgan (2008) demonstrated that the HMP extends beyond 
perceptions of news stories and news organizations to the 
perception of journalists who moderate political debates. 
Choi, Watt, and Lynch’s (2006) study of media perceptions 
of news coverage of the Iraq War found that partisans’ HMPs 
regarding news media bias extend to include perceptions of 
media credibility. 
Gunther and Schmitt (2004) note that HMPs are incon-
sistent with biased assimilation--the tendency for people to 
perceive information as being more consistent with their 
viewpoints than it really is. In examining the results of Lord, 
Ross, and Lepper (1979), they suggest a key moderator of 
whether audiences will express a hostile media response (a 
phenomenon similar to a contrast effect) or an assimilation 
effect--is the perceived reach of the message (i.e., its potential 
audience size). Messages that are expected to have little reach 
(e.g., an academic journal) will produce an assimilation ef-
fect, whereas messages that are perceived to have a large 
reach (e.g., TV news broadcasts) will elicit a HMP. In mak-
ing this case, they invoke a Third-person Perception explana-
tion. Response to a low-reach medium invokes an imagined 
audience that is largely constituted by the self and therefore 
is more naturally assimilated. On the other hand, the large-
reach medium is seen as reaching a large number of other 
people, who (consistent with the Third-person Perception) 
are likely to be more easily affected by the undesirable con-
tent, thus generating more concern about hostile media. The 
researchers demonstrate support for their contention with 
their experiment, which demonstrated that participants as-
similated a message when it took the form of an essay, and 
contrasted it when it was presented in the form of a news 
report. Other studies have corroborated this finding (Chris-
ten & Huberty, 2007; Gunther, Edgerly, Akin, & Broesch, 
2012; Gunther & Liebhart, 2006; Gunther, Miller, & 
Perception moderators.
Most studies of the HMP include a predispositional vari-
able that either produces or moderates the size of the the 
HMP. As noted above, many studies have shown that parti-
sanship is a key variable that accounts for differences in news 
media bias. Many of the studies that focus on partisanship 
as the driving force behind HMPs assume that the high 
level of issue involvement among strong partisans provides 
the impetus that accounts for their divergent perceptions. 
But as Perloff (2015) points out, confounding partisanship 
and involvement may obscure researchers’ ability to perceive 
a more nuanced understanding of the HMP. An individual’s 
position on the political ideology continuum may set the 
conditions for the HMP and relative HMP. However, involve-
ment may serve as a moderator in accentuating such percep-
tions. In the context of political elections, campaign 
involvement has been shown to be a strong predictor of the 
HMP, but the perception seems to be stronger for Republi-
cans than for Democrats (Oh, Park, & Wanta, 2011). Again, 
this does not necessarily indicate that the news media are 
more critical of conservative viewpoints, but rather, it reflects 
the pervasive political trope of the “liberal media” that has 
been such a consistent mantra of conservative candidates, 
pundits and conservative journalists, that it has become 
widely accepted as fact.
A meta-analysis of 34 HMP studies by Hansen and Kim 
(2011) confirms the importance of involvement. Matthes 
(2013) examined the role of involvement more closely by 
differentiating between cognitive and affective involvement. 
They concluded that both types of involvement make inde-
pendent contributions that help to account for partisan dif-
ferences in perceived news media bias. In another study, 
Choi, Yang, and Chang (2009) observed that “value-relevant” 
involvement (i.e., preferences related to personal values) was 
a stronger predictor of the HMP than “outcome-relevant” 
involvement (i.e., preferences related to current goals). Arpan 
and Nabi (2011) showed that anger as an emotional reaction 
to media content accentuates bias judgments.
The fact that involvement has been shown to be related 
to the HMP would seem to contradict expectations from the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and 
the Heuristic-Systematic Model (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
These models propose that high-involvement individuals are 
highly motivated to process information more systemati-
cally by examining information that is “central” to the mes-
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media conduct has been associated with the HMP, as is the 
case in one study conducted in Singapore where HMP was 
particularly salient among those exhibiting high awareness 
of the government’s role in controlling information (Chia, 
Yong, Wong, & Koh, 2007).
Effects of Hostile Media Perceptions. 
As evidenced by the studies cited above, Vallone, Ross, 
and Lepper (1985) spurred a steady stream of research that 
has continued to this day. While researchers in this area have 
used the terms “Hostile Media Perception” and “Hostile 
Media Effect” interchangeably, it would seem to be useful 
to follow the example of “third-person” research and use the 
former term to refer to the perception itself, and HME to 
describe the potential consequences of such perceptions.
Research shows that the HMP has a variety of conse-
quences. For example, many studies have considered its role 
in motivating issue-relevant behavioral engagement. 
Barnidge, Sayre, and Rojas (2015) found that HMPs served 
as motivation to engage in political participation. Kim (2015) 
also found that the HMP was associated with both political 
participation and support for restrictions on opinion poll 
reporting. Choi, Park, and Chang (2011) showed that the 
HMP motivates advocacy groups to prefer more aggressive 
strategies of confrontation. Studies have shown that the HMP 
motivates people to take corrective action by speaking out 
in public to correct potential misconceptions (Barnidge & 
Rojas, 2014; Rojas, 2010). Hwang, Pan, and Sun (2008) dem-
onstrated that HMP with respect to news coverage of social 
issues served as a source of motivation to discuss those issues 
in public. Arpan and Nabi (2011) found that news bias per-
ceptions, enhanced by anger, motivate interest in seeking 
more information. 
While many of these studies suggest that the HMP can 
provide positive effects like the motivation for engagement, 
other research indicates that the HMP can have negative 
effects that would seem to contradict the engagement argu-
ment. Tsfati (2007) found that HMPs fostered social alien-
ation among Arab citizens of Israel. HMP may also reduce 
trust and inhibit political efficacy (Tsfati & Cohen, 2005a). 
These somewhat contradictory findings leave open questions 
about why the HMP would seem to encourage social action 
under some conditions and passivity under others.
Other research has linked the HMP to perceptions of 
public opinion. In the context of the controversy over the use 
Liebhart, 2009). 
Goldman and Mutz (2011) contend that the artificial na-
ture of experimental studies in which participants are often 
exposed to a controlled set of content that is not necessarily 
consistent with their actual news media use may accentuate 
the HMP. They argue that when researchers use survey meth-
odology that examines real world media exposure in which 
citizens select news media that are more friendly to their 
political predispositions, the HMP will be muted, if not re-
versed. Results of their cross-cultural study did indeed reveal 
a “friendly” media phenomenon in that when people were 
asked to evaluate the source of news media that they use 
frequently, they found them to be supportive of their political 
perspective. This is especially true in societies that exhibit 
high levels of “media-party parallelism” (i.e., where news 
media partisanship corresponds to the ideologies of political 
parties). In such systems, people select ideologically consis-
tent media and subsequently exhibit lower levels of perceived 
news bias. 
Hartmann and Tanis’s (2012) study of the HMP in the 
context of the abortion issue notes that both in-group status 
and in-group identification moderate the HMP. Similar to 
past research showing that partisanship increases HMPs, 
this study found that in-group identification with the pro-
choice or pro-life groups was a necessary condition of the 
HMP. It was also accentuated by the perception that the 
respondent’s in-group occupies a position of lower social 
status. Ariyanto, Hornsey, and Gallois (2007) found that 
individual group identification with issue-relevant groups 
was a predictor of HMP, particularly when it interacted with 
in-group/out-group identifiers of the source of the newspaper 
article; HMPs were strongest when a message source was 
attributed to an out-group source. Reid (2012) found that 
self-categorization theory was useful in explaining HMPs 
by demonstrating that in-group and out-group cues were 
influential in moderating the HMP.
Social interactions can have an impact on HMPs. Discus-
sions with like-minded individuals can reinforce HMPs as 
reported by Eveland and Shah (2003), who found that inter-
personal discussions within the echo-chamber of politically 
homogeneous networks reinforce the HMP, particularly 
among Republicans. On the other hand, discussions that 
include alternative perspectives can reduce HMPs. For ex-
ample, media literacy programs can counteract the HMP 
(Vraga, Tully, Akin, & Rojas, 2012). In other circumstances 
though, greater awareness of the factors that shape news 
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important to note that political partisanship is a fairly stable 
predisposition that is consistent across time and across a host 
of aligned issues. Involvement, on the other hand, may vary 
from issue to issue. One person may be highly involved on 
one particular issue, but not very involved on another. More-
over, there are different types of involvement such as cogni-
tive versus emotional involvement, with the former more 
connected to levels of knowledge and the latter characterized 
by high levels of passion. They may indeed be correlated, but 
they are distinct. Similarly, there are differences between 
value-relevant involvement tied closely to an individual’s 
self-identity, outcome-relevant involvement tied closely to 
one’s personal goals, and impression-relevant involvement 
tied to the image that one projects to others (Cho & Boster, 
2004; Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Johnson & Eagly, 1990). These 
different types of involvement may manifest different rela-
tionships to the HMP, something that Choi, Yang, and Chang 
(2009) have begun to explore. While researchers have start-
ed to unpack the role of involvement in processes related to 
the HMP, there is plenty of room for future research to more 
fully differentiate the different types and dimensions of in-
volvement and further specify the nature of its various rela-
tionships to partisanship and the HMP.
Research should also look closer at the relationship be-
tween involvement and the HMP, which seems to conflict 
with the expectations of ELM/HSM processing (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). These models main-
tain that involvement leads to more systematic information 
processing. Yet, when individuals are asked to make judg-
ments regarding the bias of a media message, involvement 
leads to greater perceptions of bias--an indication that they 
are engaging in a simpler, heuristic process of message eval-
uation. This raises some interesting questions: Can this 
paradox be reconciled? Does political ideology trump the 
typical influence of involvement? 
Research on HMPs has largely treated political ideology 
as a unidimensional concept. In fact, media researchers often 
measure political ideology by combining questions about 
economic and social-political ideology into an index. While 
these two dimensions are no doubt highly correlated, there 
are individuals who express opposite positions on the two 
measures (e.g., an individual who is economically conserva-
tive, but socially liberal). In such circumstances, which di-
mension is more important in shaping media perceptions 
and subsequent choices about which media to use? Moreover, 
within ideological partisan groups, there are vast differences 
of primates in laboratory research, Gunther and Chia (2001) 
observed that HMPs had an effect on perceptions of public 
opinion in the direction of the perceived news bias. Huge 
and Glynn (2010) found that while the HMP predicted per-
ceptions of public opinion, it was not as strong as the effect 
of individuals projecting their personal opinions on public 
opinion.
When individuals perceive the news media to have a 
definitive bias against their own opinion, they are likely to 
be concerned about the effects of that media bias on others. 
Gunther and Chia (2001) use the term, “persuasive press 
inference” to refer to the process by which individuals pre-
sume influence of perceived news biases on the public at 
large. These concerns are likely to be most pronounced for 
media perceived to reach large audiences. As the PPI deals 
with perceived media effects, we will discuss it in greater 
detail in a later section.
Future directions for HMP research.
There are certain basic questions related to the HMP that 
merit further investigation. As noted, HMP research has 
revealed a contrast effect in terms of people’s perceptions of 
news bias, which seems to contradict other research on selec-
tive perception that demonstrates the human tendency to 
assimilate factual information in order to better fit an indi-
vidual’s predispositions. Future research could be useful in 
specifying the conditions that produce assimilation and con-
trast effects. Additionally, as mentioned above, researchers 
have identified several different mediating processes that 
might account for the HMP (i.e., selective recall, selective 
categorization, different judgment standards, and persistent 
cultural beliefs). While evidence has provided some indica-
tion that favors some over others (Perloff, 2015), more re-
search can further tease out the relative importance of these 
factors, as well as the conditions that make them more or 
less relevant. 
Future research can help to further clarify the relationship 
between partisanship and involvement as they together relate 
to the HMP. As mentioned above, partisanship is a political 
predisposition that leads to the HMP, with liberals seeing 
the media as having a conservative bias and conservatives 
seeing the news media as having a liberal bias. Involvement 
may serve as a moderator that amplifies this relationship 
with highly involved partisans on both sides of the spectrum 
having relatively stronger perceptions of media bias. It is 
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favor one outcome over the other. Second, researchers can 
examine media selections in the changing media landscape 
as an effect of the HMP.
As the news media landscape has become more partisan, 
so too has the political landscape. Quite a bit of attention has 
been paid to growing partisanship in government and politics 
(Galvin, 2013; Harbridge, 2015; Newman & Siegle, 2010). 
Similarly, elections and electoral politics have become more 
partisan (Jones, 2015; Kinsella, McTague, & Raleigh, 2015; 
Payett, 2015). Other research indicates that citizens are also 
becoming more ideologically polarized, exhibiting greater 
partisan hostility and incivility (Miller & Conover, 2015; 
Pew Research Center, 2014). In this increasingly partisan 
environment, we would expect greater polarization and in-
tensity in HMPs, as well as greater public debate over the 
nature of news media biases. The HMP may be seen as a 
special case of partisan-motivated reasoning (Bolsen, Druck-
man, & Cook, 2014; Levendusky, 2013) in which partisan 
identification influences understandings of reality as one is 
exposed to new information. Researchers may want to do 
more to look at HMP in this context, examining linkages 
and parallels to theory and research on partisan-motivated 
reasoning.
One of the interesting things to note about HMP research 
is that researchers have studied it using both surveys that ask 
respondents about their perceptions of news media bias (e.g., 
Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998) and experiments that dem-
onstrate differences in bias perceptions among individuals 
examining the same news story, at times attributed to differ-
ent sources (e.g., Arpan & Raney, 2003). One might expect 
that the choice of method would make a difference; how-
ever, Hansen and Kim’s meta-analysis indicates that results 
are similar across methods. As surveys tend to examine 
broader media perceptions, while experiments tend to cap-
ture attitudes toward a particular news story, the similarity 
in results is surprising. Future research could contribute by 
looking at survey vs. experimental results more closely. 
Future research might also examine whether there are 
any differences in the nature of HMPs as they pertain to bias 
perceptions regarding individual journalists, news stories, 
media organizations, and the media as a whole. As most of 
the experimental research demonstrating the HMP is based 
on exposure to single messages, research that takes a longi-
tudinal approach would not only allow a more dynamic 
picture of the stability of HMPs over time, but as Perloff 
(2015) points out, would allow researchers to examine the 
between individuals who are being grouped together. Re-
searchers could examine HMPs in partisan groups to 
determine whether there are differences by gender, socioeco-
nomic status, or other factors that would indicate that HMP 
is a moderated outcome.
In the new media environment that includes not only 
traditional media, but Internet-based media, social media 
and entertainment programs that serve as news sources for 
many individuals, ideological predispositions are likely to 
play an ever more important role in individuals’ choices about 
where to get news and information. Many traditional media 
in this more competitive media environment have become 
more likely to use ideological perspectives to differentiate 
themselves from competition (e.g., Fox News, MSNBC, Rush 
Limbaugh). Online blogs with an identifiable ideological 
bent have become more prominent sources of news and in-
formation. As more news and information come from expo-
sure to partisan media, citizens are more likely to come in 
contact with media messages that contain charges of bias 
regarding other media sources. For example, journalists and 
guests on Fox News often level charges of bias against other 
news organizations. Similarly, many blogs from both the left 
and the right dedicate considerable attention to issues of bias 
in mainstream news media. Social media also carries such 
commentary. As a result of the greater attention to main-
stream media biases by various partisan information sourc-
es, HMPs may become even more pronounced and widely 
shared.
Individuals, perhaps motivated by the confirmation bias, 
are increasingly avoiding media they consider hostile and 
are selecting news sources consistent with their ideological 
predispositions. This raises contradicting expectations about 
the implications for HMPs. On one hand, the choices that 
people make that tailor their media choices to their indi-
vidual ideologies may exhibit reduced perceptions of news 
media bias as the partisans whose media perceptions typi-
cally drive the HMP now base their observations on their 
own news media diets. This phenomenon might be particu-
larly acute for individuals who depart from their media diets 
occasionally and engage in selective perception to confirm 
their bias suspicions about non-preferred media. On the 
other hand, the partisan media diet may reinforce the percep-
tion that mainstream news media are biased. Future research 
can weigh in here in two respects. First, research can help 
adjudicate between these countervailing expectations, as 
well as identifying the moderating conditions that might 
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dia are their window to what is happening in the world. They 
worry about media bias, not only because they do not want 
their view of the world to be distorted, but also because they 
worry about the effect that biased media portrayals will have 
on others. Part of the motivation for developing perceptions 
of the media comes from concerns about the potential nega-
tive effects that media have (or the potential positive effects 
that they fail to have) on oneself, on others, and on society 
at large. In the process, people develop lay theories about 
media effects that guide them in developing media effects 
perceptions. In turn, the perceptions of media that they de-
velop may have their own effects.
Just as there are some basic psychological concepts and 
processes that color the development of media perceptions, 
there are also processes that shape the development of media 
effects perceptions. In general, people use media that they 
like and avoid media that they do not like. They tend to be 
defensive of the media they use. For example, people who 
play video games tend to emphasize the positive effects of 
game playing and downplay the negative effects. People are 
likely to be similarly defensive about the effects of other 
media that they use--emphasizing their positive effects and 
downplaying negative effects. The reverse may be true for 
the media they disdain. Conservatives may decry the brain-
washing effects of the liberal media, while ignoring the po-
tentially negative influence of watching Fox News and 
listening to Rush Limbaugh’s radio show. Liberals may ex-
press a similar pattern of egocentric, ideologically derived 
media effects perceptions. Partisans from both groups may 
also develop biased perceptions of media and media effects 
for media they do not use very often as they make inferences 
based on stereotypes. Such ideologically driven media per-
ceptions are likely to be amplified in the current polarized 
political environment, as well as further accentuated by the 
emergence of partisan media, including the Internet and 
social media.
When individuals are asked about their impressions of 
the media and media effects in general terms, their judgments 
may be subject to a negativity bias. They may exclude the 
media they use personally from the judgment process. Con-
servatives think about the “lamestream” media, while liber-
als think about the “establishment” media. In the process, 
they may be assimilating the small subset of media they do 
use, and contrasting the vast amount of media sources that 
they do not use and for which they harbor negative feelings. 
When asked to make judgments about the effects of the 
nature of causal relationships.
As more and more research is being conducted on the 
HMP, we are starting to learn more about the effects of this 
perception. One of the effects noted above concerned the 
paradoxical findings regarding the potential of the HMP to 
engage and disengage, to empower and disempower, and to 
mobilize and demobilize citizens. While these effects were 
not necessarily directly contradictory, they do motivate the 
search for the factors and structural conditions that can rec-
oncile them. Under what conditions does HMP encourage 
activation and under what conditions does it lead to passiv-
ity?
Other research seems to indicate that the HMP fosters 
increased levels of civic engagement, though other research 
indicates that it sharpens in-group/out-group distinctions 
and fosters alienation, distrust, and even lowered political 
efficacy. The HMP in an era of increasing partisanship may 
contribute to growing intolerance, incivility and hostility as 
it reinforces the attitudes and behaviors of partisans. As re-
searchers begin to expand their conceptions of potential ef-
fects of HMP, they can help to illuminate its linkages to 
factors operating in the larger political context.
As noted above, research on the effects of the HMP has 
spilled over into the area perceived media effects. It is likely 
that people who see the news media as being more biased 
will perceive the potential effects of that bias as being stron-
ger. This notion is referred to as the Persuasive Press Infer-
ence (PPI), which will be addressed below.
Media Effects Perception Concepts and 
Processes
In the previous section, we examined theory and research 
on public perceptions of the media including perceptions of 
media trustworthiness, credibility, and bias. Each of these 
perceptions involves audience impressions of news content 
and the performance of journalists, media organizations, 
and the media as an institution. Clearly, individuals recog-
nize that the media, media content, and media performance 
are important in their lives and to the functioning of society 
as a whole. People believe the media are important because 
they believe that the media have effects, whether they be 
news media, entertainment media, video games, advertising, 
or other forms of media. They care about news media trust-
worthiness and credibility because they believe that the me-
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needle model of media effects in which we see other people 
as passive recipients of powerful media effects. When asked 
to make judgments about the same negative media content 
on ourselves, we may employ a lay theory more akin to a 
limited-effects model. That is, we perceive ourselves as active 
recipients of media messages, able to deflect and mitigate 
potentially harmful effects.
Researchers examining such differences in perceptions 
of media effects have noted that perceptions of negative ef-
fects on others are different depending on how the “other” 
comparison group is constituted. Individuals tend to perceive 
negative effects on others as being greater when the specified 
comparison group is perceived as being more different from 
oneself (known as the “social-distance corollary” of the 3PP). 
That is, individuals tend to see people who are a lot like them 
as being less affected than people who are different from 
them. Again, there may be different psychological processes 
at work that might account for this finding. It might reflect 
an in-group vs. out-group bias extension of the ego-enhanc-
ing bias. People may utilize an ego-enhancing strategy by 
assuming that members of the out-group will be more af-
fected. Alternatively, such social distance judgments may 
result from perceived differences in the exposure of the com-
parison groups in which socially distant groups are seen as 
being more negatively affected because they are assumed to 
use more of the media content in question. Stereotypes about 
various comparison groups may also come into play. These 
stereotypes may be related to perceived differences in cogni-
tive capacity of different groups to resist negative effects or 
in perceived differences in exposure to the content in ques-
tion.
These basic psychological processes (and potentially oth-
ers) may be at work as people derive perceptions regarding 
media effects. Researchers who examine media effects per-
ceptions have drawn on them as part of their explanations 
for interpreting research results. As in research on media 
perceptions described above, more attention has been paid 
to the perceptions themselves than the consequences of those 
perceptions. In the section below, we assess theory and re-
search concerning media effects perceptions, including the 
effects of effects perceptions and the future of research in 
this area.
generalized media, negative effects may be inflated and 
positive effects minimized. 
Other factors may contribute to a negative bias in media 
effects perceptions. First, people may emphasize the negative 
because it makes for more provocative conversation. That is, 
people are more likely to become engaged in conversations 
involving complaints about the negative effects of media than 
they are to participate in conversations praising the positive 
effects. Media and media effects are in a sense a lightning 
rod for public criticism. Moreover, people are more likely to 
be concerned about perceived negative effects and more 
blasé about positive effects. Negative media content and ef-
fects may also be more vivid and seen as having more of an 
impact. For example, violent images in the news or entertain-
ment television, or in video games have a more memorable 
impact for use in subsequent effects judgments. Ultimately 
then, we may all develop perceptions of media effects, but 
these perceptions may overestimate their negative effects and 
downplay positive effects.
There are other psychological processes that come into 
play when individuals are asked to make distinctions between 
the effects of media on the self and on other people. When 
it comes to negative media effects, people tend to perceive 
these negative effects to be greater on other people than they 
are on oneself, a tendency known as the “Third-person Per-
ception” (3PP). Theorists have suggested several psycho-
logical principles to account for this differential in perceived 
negative effects. It may be that people are engaging in an 
optimistic (or immunity) bias in ignoring potential negative 
consequences of media exposure on themselves, while rec-
ognizing the negative impact on others. An ego-enhancing 
bias in which people hold the view that they are superior to 
others may also account for the differential. If an ego-en-
hancing bias is at work for potentially negative media effects, 
research results indicate that it may not be as relevant for 
positive media effects as there is less research evidence to 
support a first-person perception (1PP) for positive media 
messages. That is, the perception that we are more affected 
than other people by positive media does not appear to be as 
pronounced nor as consistent as the 3PP for negative media 
effects. Another psychological process may also contribute 
to differences in perceived negative effects--different im-
plicit lay theories of media effects used in making judgments 
regarding negative effects on self from the one used to make 
judgments about the effects on others. In judging effects on 
others, we may employ a quasi-magic bullet or hypodermic 
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of a given issue is perceived as favoring a particular view-
point, estimates of public opinion are seen as consistent with 
that perceived slant (Mutz & Soss, 1997; Gunther & Chia, 
2001). Several experiments have demonstrated this process. 
In these studies, respondents who read news stories ma-
nipulated to be biased in favor of a particular viewpoint 
believed that public opinion tilted in the direction given pref-
erence within the stories (Gunther, 1998; Gunther et al., 
2001). The PPI has been explored for issues such as physician-
assisted suicide (Gunther & Christen, 2002), use of animals 
in research (Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 2001), the 
health hazards of radon gas (Gunther & Christen, 2002), and 
the use of a controversial agricultural growth hormone (Gun-
ther, 1998). Compared to the other areas of research over-
viewed in this article, relatively few studies have explored 
the PPI (see Table 1).
History and rationale.
The PPI may appear to require a great deal of effort from 
the audience. Is it reasonable to expect that members of the 
news audience judge media content, imagine how that con-
tent would be received by the rest of the audience, and then 
infer what everybody else is thinking based on that perceived 
media influence? In answer to such a question, Gunther 
(1998) explained that an information-rich media environment 
and a host of cognitive quirks make the PPI process almost 
effortless for the perceiver.
The first proposition of the PPI is that people are able to 
extrapolate from a small sample of news content to form 
more general impressions of news coverage. When proposing 
PPI, Gunther (1998) noted that a small sample of news cov-
erage are relatively easy to find. This observation is even 
more applicable to today’s hyper-connected world, where a 
brief scroll through a social media feed may result in expo-
sure to dozens of news headlines. This small sample of news 
coverage can then easily be seen as representative of the 
wider media environment. The law-of-small-numbers bias 
demonstrates that people are prone to think of a small sam-
ple as representative of a population (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1971). For the PPI, this means that if people see a handful of 
news articles slanting in a particular direction, they may 
believe those articles are representative of the slant perpetu-
ated in the wider news media landscape. In PPI experiments 
where respondents read a single news article and then esti-
mated public opinion, there is evidence that respondents 
Perceptions of Media Effects and Effects of 
Perceived Media Effects
In this section, we address two distinct areas of Presumed 
Influence (PI) research that examine media effects percep-
tions: the Persuasive Press Inference (PPI) and the Third-
person Perception (3PP). PPI is to some degree an outcome 
of the HMP (see above). Individuals who perceive the news 
media to be hostile to their viewpoint are likely to be con-
cerned about the influence that biased coverage will have on 
the public. In other words, perceiving news as biased is 
likely to accentuate concerns about the undue influence of 
a biased and powerful press (i.e., PPI) on the larger public. 
Research on the 3PP examines differences between perceived 
media effects on oneself and on other people, though 3PP 
research tends to be broader than PPI in that extends beyond 
looking at the effects of news media to include also percep-
tions of the effects of entertainment media. Though the con-
nection to HMP is not as readily obvious as it is for PPI, the 
3PP that does focus on perceived effects of news media may 
also have a link to HMP in that the HMP may accentuate 
perceptions of media effects on others.  In sections that fol-
low, we discuss the research on both the PPI and the 3PP, 
including the variety of the consequent outcomes and impli-
cations.
Persuasive Press Inference and Effects.
Mutz and Soss (1997) once explored the ability of the 
news media to move public opinion by gauging whether a 
newspaper with an editorial agenda could sway public senti-
ment in its favor. The attempt was unsuccessful — readers’ 
opinions did not budge — but when those unaffected readers 
were asked to estimate their community’s stance on the issue, 
they figured others’ opinions had changed. This finding il-
lustrates one possible consequence of presumed media influ-
ence: News messages may be perceived to affect public 
opinion, even if they never actually do.
This possibility is explored by the Persuasive Press Infer-
ence (PPI), a process where individuals judge the slant of 
news coverage. The PPI assumes that content has influenced 
the public, and thus figure that public opinion is consistent 
with the perceived bias of the media (Gunther, 1998). Re-
search on the PPI has focused specifically on news media 
messages. Researchers have noted that when news coverage 
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dividuals navigate on a daily basis.
Because of the impact these social perceptions have on 
how individuals think and behave themselves, scholars have 
worked to understand the factors that contribute to these 
perceptions. The projection effect, the tendency to project 
our opinions onto others, is perhaps the most well docu-
mented of the contributors to perceived public opinion. As 
Fields and Schuman (1976) put it, people “look out into the 
world and somehow see their own opinions reflected back” 
(p. 437). Researchers have documented this tendency to proj-
ect personal opinions onto others across a variety of prefer-
ences and behaviors (Brown, 1982; Whitley, 1998; Watt & 
Larkin, 2010). Why are individuals so quick to assume oth-
ers think or act as they do? Ross et al. (1977) suggested that 
people tend to surround themselves with like-minded indi-
viduals, and therefore their most accessible cues about pub-
lic opinion come from a sample that thinks as they do. It may 
also be the case that projection is driven by a need to main-
tain self-esteem by thinking others support our views (Marks 
& Miller, 1988).
If projection were the only force shaping perceptions of 
public opinion, it would follow that everyone would believe 
themselves to be in the opinion majority at all times. But 
people do not always believe others share their views, and 
the PPI offers a countervailing force to the powerful urge to 
project. One of the more interesting implications of the PPI 
is that it may help explain why a person believes public opin-
ion to be hostile relative to their own opinion. This implica-
tion is possible because of the tendency to view news content 
as biased in an undesirable fashion, a tendency chronicled 
in Hostile Media Perception research (reviewed above). If 
news consumers tend to view news coverage as hostile to 
their own views, and they assume others have been influ-
enced by that biased content, then it follows that they would 
assume others’ opinions are consistent with that slanted 
coverage. In other words, the vulnerable audience of others 
is thought to be swayed by content judged as unfavorable to 
one’s preferred position. The PPI thus outlines how a media 
perception, HMP, can be consequential (Figure 1).
Projection and the PPI appear to go head-to-head as con-
tributors to perceptions of public opinion, and the competing 
processes would predict different outcomes. On the one hand, 
projection would lead a perceiver to the conclusion that the 
opinion climate is congenial. On the other hand, the PPI 
would account for the impact of undesirable news media 
influence, leading to the conclusion that the opinion climate 
believed public opinion was consistent with the perceived 
slant of the news article only when that article was seen as 
representative of the slant in media coverage in general (Gun-
ther et al., 2001).
PPI’s second proposition is that people generally believe 
others are exposed to news media. Mass media is, by defini-
tion, far-reaching — but this seemingly obvious fact is criti-
cal to the logic of PPI. A news message’s power to persuade 
others is meaningless if the others never see the message. 
The perceived exposure of others to news content is thus a 
necessary condition for the PPI, and there is evidence that 
people do tend to recognize the sweeping reach of media 
messages (Parisot, 1988).
The final and most critical proposition of PPI is that 
people believe news coverage affects the opinions of those 
who consume it. This proposition involves assumptions in-
dividuals make about the power of news media, as well as 
assumptions they make about the vulnerability of the news 
audience. As discussed above, research concerning the pre-
sumed influence of media shows that people generally believe 
media to be a powerful force (Perloff, 2009). When a belief 
in powerful media connects with the tendency to believe 
others are vulnerable to outside influence, it is easy to see 
how individuals might come to believe media help shape 
others’ opinions (Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004). As Gun-
ther (1998) explained, “people can easily form an idea of 
what others are thinking by inferring it from the information 
they think others are getting” (p. 489).
Perceptions of public opinion. 
The PPI process outlines one way in which perceptions 
of media content are related to perceptions of public opinion. 
Scholars have long been interested in individuals’ perceptions 
of what others are thinking or doing because it is often the 
case that these social perceptions guide individuals’ own 
attitudes and behaviors. Those who sense more support for 
their ideas are more willing to express those opinions (Glynn, 
Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997; Dvir-Gvirsman, Garrett, & Ts-
fati, 2015), and conversely, those who sense they have less 
support for their views are less likely to speak out (Noelle-
Neumann, 1984). People are also more likely to behave in 
ways they see as consistent with others’ behavior (Prentice 
& Miller, 1993), and conform their judgments to fit in with 
those around them (Asch, 1956). Perceptions of what others 
are thinking and doing constitute the social reality that in-
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result in an accurate assessment of public opinion; however, 
if the perceiver believes news coverage has been favorable to 
the minority, the presumed influence of that coverage on 
others might constrain the projection effect. The result might 
be that, due to the presumed influence of media coverage, 
the perceiver thinks public opinion is less congenial than it 
really is. On the other hand, a perceiver with a minority 
opinion would be tempted to project it onto others – and 
perceptions of undesirable media influence on others could 
theoretically counter that tendency, bringing the perceiver’s 
public opinion assessment closer to reality.
Perceptions of public opinion are of great interest to re-
searchers, as discussed earlier, and it can be particularly 
interesting when those perceptions are actually mispercep-
tions.
Research on pluralistic ignorance shows that people often 
hold faulty ideas about what others are thinking or doing 
(O’Gorman, 1986). Even slight miscalculations about the 
opinion climate can be consequential, as a situation is cre-
ated where those with opposing opinions “react to each 
other in terms of the perceived and not necessarily the ac-
tual relative strengths of the two factions,” (Mullen & Smith, 
1990, p. 505).
Alternative links between media and public opinion.
 There are, to be sure, more straightforward explanations 
that account for the relationship between perceptions of news 
content and perceptions of public opinion. A challenge of 
PPI research is to find the indirect path of presumed influ-
ence in the midst of a tangle of other routes linking news 
media and perceived public opinion. These alternative paths 
include the idea that media contain cues about what others 
are thinking that may directly shape social reality, the idea 
that media may sway personal opinions — which would then 
be projected onto others, and the idea that rather than shape 
public opinion, media simply reflect it. 
First, journalists often describe the state of public opinion 
in their news reports. The most obvious way of doing so is 
to report polling results, and doing so has become an increas-
ingly common practice in news reporting (Frankovic, 2005). 
These explicit public opinion cues are then easily accessible 
when individuals are prompted to estimate what others are 
thinking (Iyengar, 1990; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995), and 
research has shown that people can accurately recall infor-
mation from polls (McAllister & Studlar, 1991). It comes as 
is unfriendly, or at least relatively unfriendly, to an individ-
ual’s position. Scholars who have simultaneously tested the 
influence of projection and the PPI on perceptions of public 
opinion have demonstrated that personal opinion exerts both 
a direct effect on perceived public opinion and an indirect 
effect through perceived media slant (Gunther & Chia, 2001; 
Gunther & Christen, 2002). In other words, the processes 
can occur together. At times, the PPI has been shown to 
offset projection. For example, supporters of physician-as-
sisted suicide imagined a friendly opinion climate when they 
saw news coverage as friendly or neutral to the issue, but 
believed public opinion was against their position when they 
saw news coverage as hostile to their views (Gunther & Chris-
ten, 2002). However, Huge and Glynn (2010) found that 
perceived media bias did not explain any additional variance 
in perceived public opinion after accounting for the role of 
projection. The discrepancy may be because the latter study 
linked perceptions of public opinion to perceptions of hostile 
media bias, whereas other PPI studies looked at the associa-
tion between perceived public opinion and perceived news 
slant — a slant that is often, but not always, a hostile one.
The fact that perceptions of media are not always hostile, 
at least in an absolute sense, further complicates the dy-
namic between PPI and projection. As discussed above, 
hostile media judgments can be relative: Two groups of par-
tisans may agree on the slant of news media coverage, but 
the group not favored by the slant will see a steeper tilt away 
from its position, compared to the group favored by the slant. 
The group seeing a friendly slant in media coverage would 
not see public opinion as hostile because the media that is 
presumed to influence others’ opinions actually has a favor-
able slant (Gunther et al., 2001). The existence of the relative 
HMP reminds that hostile media is not necessarily seen as 
influential, and thus affecting public opinion. To the con-
trary, the crux of PPI is that public opinion is inferred from 
the perceived slant of news coverage, regardless of whether 
that slant is thought to be hostile.
Accuracy of perceptions. 
The PPI may help researchers more accurately predict 
perceptions of public opinion, but it does not necessarily 
improve (or worsen) the accuracy of those public opinion 
estimates. In a situation where a perceiver holds the major-
ity opinion, the projection process would encourage them to 
believe others think as they do. In this case, projection would 
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membership).
Support for the presumed influence mechanism.
There is clear evidence of multiple links between news 
media content and perceptions of public opinion. The PPI 
does not rule out these alternative ways that media help shape 
social reality. People do gain impressions of public opinion 
from cues embedded in media content, and media messages 
often do affect personal opinions, which may then be pro-
jected onto others. It is also possible that media may be seen 
as reflecting public opinion. These alternative accounts of 
how media may impact perceptions of public opinion could 
work simultaneously with the PPI. Rather than eliminate 
the possibility of a direct effect of news media on social per-
ceptions, the challenge of PPI research is to provide support 
for the path between news content and perceived public opin-
ion carved by presumed influence. The PPI proposes that 
one way media affect perceptions of public opinion is through 
a process where individuals assume others have been influ-
enced by news coverage. This process identifies presumed 
influence as a mediating link between media perceptions 
and perceived public opinion. PPI researchers have used 
several tactics to look for evidence of this presumed media 
influence.
First, if news media simply provide cues about public 
opinion and the PPI is not at work, then the knowledge that 
others have been exposed to biased media content would not 
have any bearing on perceptions of public opinion. News 
consumers would get their cues about public opinion di-
rectly from the content they consume, regardless of whether 
they think anyone else has seen that content. However, there 
is evidence that this is not the case. Several studies have 
shown that believing others have been exposed to news con-
tent does affect the relationship between media perceptions 
and perceived public opinion. Gunther et al. (2001) found 
that perceived slant and the perceived reach of media interact, 
such that in high-reach conditions, the perceived slant of a 
news article was positively associated with perceived public 
sentiment. In the low-reach condition, the manipulation of 
the article slant did not result in a corresponding change in 
perceived public opinion. Perceived news slant was only 
related to perceived public opinion when the perceiver be-
lieved others had been exposed to the message.
Another tactic that researchers have used to test the pre-
sumed influence mechanism of the PPI is to experimentally 
no surprise, then, that when people read news stories featur-
ing poll results, their estimates of public opinion tend to re-
flect the polling information provided in the news (Zerback, 
Koch, & Kramer, 2015). Additionally, on the Internet, user-
generated comments and evaluations could be viewed as 
indicators of public opinion on the news topic.
Besides including explicit information about the opinion 
climate, media also provide plenty of anecdotal indicators 
of public opinion through exemplars. The voices presented 
in news coverage, including both sources and bystanders 
(McLeod & Hertog, 1992) are thus an accessible sample of 
public opinion. For example, those who consume media that 
is ideologically similar to their own views perceive the pub-
lic opinion climate to be more congenial (Dvir-Gvirsman, 
Garrett, & Tsfati, 2015), and conversely, those who consume 
media dissimilar to their views see the opinion climate as 
hostile (Wojcieszak & Rojas, 2011). In this direct relationship 
between media and perceived public opinion, differences in 
perceptions of public opinion are explained by the different 
news content people consume and the exemplars they see in 
that coverage. Similarly, the perceived slant of news coverage 
may offer a direct impression of public sentiment. Rather 
than perceive a slant in news coverage and assume it has 
influenced others, news consumers may assume that media 
coverage reflects current public opinion. In other words, 
rather than news coverage shaping public opinion, it may be 
the case that individuals believe public opinion shapes news 
coverage.
A final alternative explanation for the relationship be-
tween media and perceived public opinion is that media slant 
may directly affect personal opinion, which would then be 
projected onto the public. Gunther (1998) found that respon-
dents who read an article with a favorable slant toward an 
agricultural growth hormone reported being more favorable 
to the issue themselves, compared to those who read an ar-
ticle with an unfavorable slant. Similarly, Zerback et al. 
(2015) observed that those who read a news article featuring 
arguments supporting a proposed railway extension were 
more supportive of the proposal themselves. In these studies, 
personal opinion was related to perceived public opinion, 
suggesting that the slant of the articles may have affected 
perceived public opinion by first swaying personal opinion. 
This direct influence of media slant on personal opinion may 
occur when the news topic is unfamiliar and the positions 
featured in news coverage do not conflict with any pre-ex-
isting, higher-order attitudes (e.g., partisanship, group 
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opinion and perceptions of news coverage. The lack of a 
positive relationship between personal opinion and perceived 
news slant, along with evidence linking perceived changes 
in public opinion to the timing of news reports, serve as 
evidence that media are seen as shaping, rather than reflect-
ing, public opinion.
Future directions for PPI research.
The PPI provides a framework for understanding one way 
that media content may affect perceptions of public opinion. 
Studies mapping the PPI process have shown that news con-
sumers judge the slant of news content and then evaluate 
public opinion as being consistent with that slant. Studies 
showing that this relationship exists only when perceivers 
believe others have been exposed to the news content in 
question serve as evidence of presumed influence – the idea 
that individuals assume others have been influenced by news 
media, and thus those others hold opinions congruent with 
the slant advanced by media content. But because there are 
many explanations for the link between news content and 
perceived public opinion, more research should test whether 
the PPI is still a viable path after accounting for more direct 
explanations for the relationship between media and social 
perceptions (i.e.. implicit and explicit cues as to the state of 
public opinion). 
Future PPI research might explore the type of media 
consumer who is likely to anticipate powerful media effects, 
and in addition, who is most likely to use presumptions of 
media influence when estimating public opinion. Certain 
individuals may be more aware of the distribution of public 
opinion for an issue (e.g., those who are highly knowledge-
able about an issue) and would not use perceived media slant 
as an indication of public opinion. Alternatively, it could be 
the case that those highly knowledgeable about and highly 
involved in an issue are those who are most concerned about 
media influence, and thus may pay more attention to the 
slant in coverage and the possibility that it would sway oth-
ers. To date, moderators of the PPI process have been large-
ly unexplored.
Perhaps the most critical contribution of the PPI is that 
it considers many possible relationships between media and 
social perceptions and offers a process for tracing the unique 
contribution of presumed media influence to perceptions of 
what others are doing and thinking. PPI research demon-
strates that people believe media have effects on others, and 
manipulate embedded public opinion cues and story slant 
simultaneously. If perceptions of public opinion stem most-
ly from public opinion cues featured in media coverage, then 
the slant of the article should not affect perceived public 
opinion when such cues are present. In other words, percep-
tions of public opinion should follow the implicit cues (e.g., 
exemplars) or explicit cues (e.g., polling results) rather than 
the perceived slant of news coverage. To test this, Gunther 
(1998) manipulated story slant (favorable/unfavorable) and 
an implicit public opinion cue about an agricultural growth 
hormone (anecdotal quotes from members of the public). 
Results showed that the manipulated slant of the article af-
fected estimates of public opinion in the condition with the 
implicit cue and without it. Similar results were found in 
another study that manipulated story slant alongside a more 
explicit public opinion cue (the story informed respondents 
which position was held by a majority of the public). In this 
study, Gunther and Christen (1999) found that there was a 
main effect of story slant on public opinion estimates, but no 
main effect for the explicit cue of being informed as to which 
opinion was held by the majority of the public. The fact that 
perceived news slant affected perceived public opinion re-
gardless of whether other cues were present is evidence that 
people gave some consideration to the impact the articles 
would have on others’ opinions. 
However, it could be the case that those news articles 
were seen as reflecting public opinion, rather than shaping 
it. One way of demonstrating that the relationships observed 
are due to presumed influence is to link perceived changes 
in public opinion to the timing of news reports. In several 
studies, respondents read recently published news articles 
and then reported that a change in public opinion occurred 
“in the last few days” (Gunther, 1998; Gunther & Christen, 
1999). Additionally, if news coverage is seen as reflecting 
public opinion, then there should be a positive relationship 
between personal opinion and media coverage similar in 
strength to the positive relationship between personal opin-
ion and perceived public opinion. In other words, people 
would project their own opinions onto others and then proj-
ect that perceived public opinion onto the news media. This 
would result in a positive association between personal opin-
ion and perceptions of news coverage; however, PPI studies 
have demonstrated the relationship between personal opin-
ion and perceived news slant (Gunther & Christen, 2002). 
Indeed, the very existence of the HMP demonstrates that 
there tends to be a negative association between personal 
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concept has spread beyond the field of communication into 
research from other fields including public health, medicine, 
nutrition, public policy, education, psychology, social work, 
business, management, ergonomics, computer science, and 
transportation safety.
The 3PP has been found consistently across a variety of 
different contexts in which there is concern about harmful 
effects on the public stemming from news media, entertain-
ment media, advertising, music, pornography, and video 
games. The 3PP has been found for perceived effects of news 
programming (Cohen et al., 1988; Price, Huang, & Tewks-
bury, 1997) as well as for the TV violence in entertainment 
programming (Gunther & Hwa, 1996; Innes & Zeitz, 1988; 
Rojas, Shah, & Faber, 1996; Salwen & Dupagne, 1999; Schar-
rer, 2002). It occurs for reality TV (Leone, Peek, & Bissell, 
2006), TV trial coverage (Salwen & Dupagne, 1999), election 
coverage (Innes & Zeitz, 1988; Salwen, 1998), and for the 
reporting of election polls (Kim, 2015; Price & Stroud, 2006). 
The 3PP has also been extended to forms of communication 
content such as the use of mobile phones for sexting (Wei & 
Lo, 2013), violent and misogynistic rap and death metal 
music (McLeod, Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997), video games 
(Hong, 2015; Scharrer & Leone, 2006; Zhong, 2009), and 
vulnerability to personal selling techniques (Tal-Or, Shilo, 
& Meister, 2009). In one ironic twist, Johnson, Goidel, and 
Climek (2014) found a 3PP in a situation when content was 
being taken away. When the New Orleans Times-Picayune went 
from being a daily to three-times-a-week publication, survey 
respondents perceived that other people would be more ad-
versely affected.
The 3PP has been observed for a variety of different types 
of strategic communication messages including advertising 
for controversial products such as cigarettes, alcohol, and 
gambling (Shah, Faber, & Youn, 1999; Youn, Faber, & Shah, 
2000), messages encouraging and discouraging smoking 
(Meirick, 2005) and alcohol use (David, Liu, & Myser, 2004), 
Holocaust denial advertising (Price, Huang, & Tewksbury, 
1997), manipulative marketing techniques (Jung & Jo, 2013; 
Xie & Johnson, 2015), alcohol product placements (Shin & 
Kim, 2011), direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) for pre-
scription drugs (DeLorme, Huh, & Reid, 2006; Huh, Delo-
rme & Reid, 2004; Huh & Langteau, 2007; Zwier & Bolink, 
2011), political advertising (Cheng & Riffe, 2008; Cohen & 
Davis, 1991; Rucinski & Salmon, 1990; Salwen & Dupagne, 
1999; Wei & Lo, 2007), and public relations (Park & Salmon, 
2005). Women in Singapore exhibited a 3PP regarding the 
it does so without directly asking people whether media are 
influential. Demonstrating how media messages affect per-
ceptions of what others are doing or thinking is valuable for 
researchers looking at how people might react to those social 
perceptions. Scholars have long since established that indi-
viduals may act or think in accordance with what they believe 
others around them are doing or thinking — but the bit of 
that process that attracts media scholars is that some of those 
perceptions come from media. Specifically, the PPI illustrates 
that social perceptions may fluctuate as a simple consequence 
of the presumed power of media messages. From there, re-
searchers are able to explore how those impressions of what 
others are thinking or doing might affect the actions and 
thoughts of the perceiver, a task that is the focus of influence 
of presumed influence (IPI) studies. 
Third-person Perceptions and Effects.
Davison (1983) triggered an avalanche of research on the 
third-person phenomenon when he noted that individuals 
tend to see media effects on others as being greater than ef-
fects on themselves. Of the five specific of media perceptions 
research covered in this article, research on the Third-person 
Perception (3PP) has received the most attention with 200 
articles identified by our literature search since 1992 (Table 1). 
Moreover, the 3PP has been documented for the perceived 
effects of a variety content such as news media, entertain-
ment media, advertising, and video games.
Meta-analyses show that the 3PP has been an incredibly 
robust phenomenon (Sun, Pan, & Shen, 2008; Paul, Salwen, 
& Dupagne, 2000). In their analysis of 106 3PP studies, Sun, 
Pan, and Shen (2008) found that the 3PP was consistently 
supported despite variations in methods and measurement. 
They also identified several significant moderators of the 
size of the 3PP gap, including level of anti-social content, 
perceived vulnerability of the comparison group, dissimilar-
ity to self, and likelihood of exposure. An experiment by 
David, Liu, and Myser (2004) showed that the 3PP persisted 
despite manipulations intended to reduce it by informing 
participants of its self-serving underpinnings. Evidence on 
the 3PP and its consequences has been conducted in countries 
around the world including Australia, Germany, Great Brit-
ain, Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, Netherlands, Singapore, 
Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, and the United States 
with a surprising degree of consistency. The influence of this 
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conclusions that have been reached on effects estimation may 
be due to the different content in question.
Ego-enhancement. 
The most common explanation rendered to account for 
the 3PP is that it is part of a self-serving strategy to bolster 
one’s ego (see Brown, 1986) by trying to downplay effects on 
oneself relative to perceived effects on others (Duck, Hogg, 
& Terry, 1999; Gunther & Mundy, 1993; Gunther & Thorson, 
1992; Perloff, 2002). Feeling that one is less affected than 
others is presumed to enhance one’s self-esteem. This inter-
pretation is supported by two sets of research findings (dis-
cussed further below). 
First, there is the first-person effect (1PP) finding (see 
Gunther & Mundy, 1993) that the differential perception 
disappears (and possibly reverses in some cases) when the 
media effect in question is positive (i.e., being immune to 
positive effects is not ego-gratifying). Perloff (1999) notes 
that, “researchers have argued that formats that are seen as 
‘not smart to be influenced by’ (i.e., product advertisements) 
should lead to greater TPE [i.e., 3PP] than genres that lack 
this connotation (PSAs, prosocial campaigns, and news” 
(pp. 359-360). Some research supports this interpretation 
(e.g., Brosius & Engel 1996), while some does not (e.g., Chap-
in, 1999). 
Second, a line of findings concerning the social distance 
corollary (see Cohen et al., 1988) shows that perceived effects 
on others increase for comparison groups that are more dis-
similar from the research participant. Cohen et al.’s (1988) 
interpretation is that more distant comparison groups have 
less ego-enhancing potential.
Optimistic bias. 
Individuals who express a 3PP may also be engaging in 
an “optimistic bias,” an explanation that is similar to ego-
enhancing strategies (Shepperd et al., 2002; Weinstein, 1980). 
The optimistic bias is typically measured in much the same 
way as 3PP, by asking people to estimate their personal risk 
of experiencing negative consequences and comparing that 
to their estimation of the risk of others. As with the 3PP, 
individuals often see themselves as facing less risk than 
other people. In fact, the 3PP may be a special case of the 
optimistic bias expressed in the context of risk of experienc-
ing harmful media effects. Explanations of the optimistic 
effects of advertising’s potentially negative effects on body 
image (Chia, 2007; Chia, 2009), though the size of the 3PP 
was negatively associated with the desire to go on a diet. 
However, a study of perceived effects of media depictions of 
idealized body images in the U.S. (presumably advertising 
and/or entertainment media though not specified in this 
study) found the 3PP for men only (Park, Yun, McSweeney, 
& Gunther, 2007).
Given the degree of public concern over the effects of 
pornography, it is not surprising that several studies have 
examined 3PP in this context (Gunther, 1995; Lee & Tam-
borini, 2005; Lo & Wei, 2002; Reid et al., 2007; Rojas, Shah, 
& Faber, 1996). Guerrero-Sole, Besalu, and Lopez-Gonzalez 
(2014) replicated the 3PP for violent, pornographic, and trash 
TV in Spain.
Explanations for 3PP. 
Given the robust nature of the 3PP, which has been ob-
served in different communication content contexts, in a 
variety of different nations, in different sub-populations, and 
using a variety of different methodological techniques, re-
searchers have tried to elaborate on the different perceptual 
mechanisms that would help explain why it occurs. While 
the theoretical explanations are numerous, research has 
failed to arrive at a consensus as to exactly what accounts 
for the 3PP. Most likely, there are a variety of different factors 
at play that may contribute differentially under different 
conditions.
Assessment errors. 
3PP researchers have often noted that given the pervasive-
ness of the tendency for people to see others as being more 
affected by negative media messages than they are them-
selves, some of these assessments must be erroneous. Either 
people are overestimating effects on others, underestimating 
effects on self, or both (Perloff, 1996). Some studies show 
that the overestimation of effects on others is to blame (Gun-
ther, 1991; Perloff et al., 1992; Price, Tewksbury, & Huang, 
1998). Cohen et al. (1988) found that individuals overestimate 
effects on others and underestimate effects on self, while 
Gunther and Thorson (1992) found that individuals tend to 
overestimate effects on self as well as on others. Douglas and 
Sutton (2004) attribute the differential to the underestimation 
of effects on self. To be sure, some of the differences in the 
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media effects when making their judgments. Perhaps, when 
individuals are asked about effects on the general audience, 
people employ a quasi-magic bullet model, where media ef-
fects are seen as being direct and powerful on a passive audi-
ence. By contrast, they may recognize the role that they play 
in actively insulating themselves from direct effects. That is, 
they may be applying a less powerful, indirect, limited effects 
model when assessing effects on themselves (McLeod, De-
tenber, & Eveland, 2001). Perloff (1999) makes a similar point 
by invoking attribution theory to propose that individuals 
see themselves as able to defend themselves against negative 
messages, while inferring that others lack the dispositional 
ability to do so. In a study concerning the perceived effects 
of pro- and anti- tobacco and of alcohol advertisements, Mei-
rick (2006) extended the notion that people have different 
implicit models of negative media effects to positive media 
effects and attempted to measure such media effects schema. 
While these attempts to unveil the mechanisms that people 
use to estimate effects on self and others have been produc-
tive, the lack of clear-cut answers should motivate further 
research.
As some research has cast doubt upon the conventional 
ego-enhancement and optimistic bias explanations (see 
Chapin, 2000; McLeod, Detenber, & Eveland, 2001; Salwen 
& Dupagne, 2003; Tal-Or & Tsfati, 2007), it is clear that more 
research is needed to evaluate these various explanations.
The social distance corollary.
Cohen et al. (1988) proposed that one reason for the social 
distance corollary finding is that as the 3PP comparison 
group gets more socially distant from (or more unlike) the 
individual respondent, the less ego-enhancing utility they 
will have. This finding has been corroborated by numerous 
other studies (e.g., Jensen & Hurley, 2005; Paek et al., 2005; 
Tewksbury, 2002; Tsfati & Cohen, 2004; Zhong, 2009). Ts-
fati, Ribak, and Cohen (2005) found that parents tend to see 
other people’s children as more affected by exposure to a 
telenovela than their own. In a recent example of this finding, 
Yu (2012) observed that mothers believed that TV food ad-
vertising has more impact on other people’s children than 
on their own. Scherr, Muller, and Fast (2013) found that 
German students perceived greater effects of exposure to 
Rate My Professor evaluations for students at other univer-
sities, than for students at their own university. Addition-
ally, the degree to which the social distance of comparison 
bias include ego-enhancement (as explained above), self-
presentation (a strategy of trying to present oneself in a 
positive way), and exerting control (a strategy of making 
oneself feel more in control over their destiny). Wei, Lo, and 
Lu (2007) conclude that while both the 3PP and optimistic 
bias may result from an ego-enhancing self-serving bias, they 
are conceptually distinct processes.
Paternalism. 
McLeod, Eveland, and Nathanson (1997) offer the expla-
nation that the 3PP is an indication of an underlying pater-
nalistic attitude in the people who exhibit the largest 
differentials. To be sure, such an attitude may be ego-en-
hancing in that paternalism implies an element of superior-
ity. Moreover, paternalism may be at work in bridging the 
3PP to consequences like censorship and the perception that 
others might need to be protected.
Biased perceptions.
Tal-Or and Tsfati (2007) offered another explanation: the 
3PP might be a function of biased perceptions. As non-neu-
tral observers of one’s own experience, individuals might not 
recognize the influence that media have on themselves (in 
the same way that teenagers may not recognize the benefits 
of education in enhancing their cognitive development). It 
is difficult for an individual to observe and fully appreciate 
how media products affect them. They may not feel affected 
at all when they play violent video games or are exposed to 
advertising. But logically, they may agree that other people 
out there are being affected. They may infer that the vast 
amount of money that is spent on advertising must mean 
that some people are being affected by it even if it does not 
feel like they are affected. Perloff (1996) notes that people 
may be more aware of the psychological vulnerabilities to 
media effects on others than they are on their own vulner-
abilities.
Different media effects heuristics.
Perloff (2002) noted that when respondents are asked to 
make effects judgments, it may be easier to imagine that a 
“faceless,” generalized audience will be affected by the media 
than to imagine it affecting oneself. Building on this idea, it 
may be that individuals apply different implicit models of 
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now, we will consider issues related to how 3PP is assessed.
Many studies construct a subtractive score to represent 
the 3PP (e.g., Gunther, 1995; Gunther & Hwa, 1996) by start-
ing with perceived effects on others and subtracting out per-
ceived effects on self. These studies use that score as a 
predictor of 3PP consequences such as censorship. The sub-
tractive score is logical given the argument that people who 
exhibit a large 3PP differential would exhibit greater support 
for content restrictions. There are a couple of issues with this 
procedure. First, we do not know which of the two measured 
factors is contributing to the size of the differential. If, for 
instance, all individuals feel that they are not at all affected 
by negative content, then all of the variance would be coming 
from perceived effects on others. Put another way, there 
would be no difference between the 3PP and perceived effects 
on others. Second, individuals with the same differential 
score would be treated the same, even one person with a gap 
of 2.0 on a 7-point scale might be on the low end of the scale 
and another person with the same 2.0 gap could be on the 
high end of the scale. Thus a person who thinks the content 
in question has little effect on self and others would receive 
the same differential score as someone who perceived power-
ful effects on both self and others.
In order to avoid these issues, McLeod, Detenber, and 
Eveland (2001) treated perceived effects on self and perceived 
effects on others as separate predictors. Finding that both 
types of perceived effects predict support for censorship is 
important, but it does not speak to the 3PE hypothesis that 
those who see others as affected more than themselves are 
most supportive of content restrictions.
Another measurement approach to this problem has been 
the use of the “diamond” model (as employed by McLeod, 
Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997; Neuwirth & Frederick, 2002; 
Neuwirth, Frederick, & Mayo, 2002; and Shah, Faber, & 
Youn, 1999). This approach uses both the subtractive mea-
sure (other - self) as the representation of the 3PP and an 
additive (other + self) as a representation of the overall pow-
er of the media as predictors in the 3PE regression equation. 
In this way, the predictive power of the 3PP can be esti-
mated after controlling for perceived effects.
Boyle, Schmierbach, and McLeod (2013) conducted an 
evaluation of the different methodological strategies that are 
used to assess the 3PP by analyzing 73 studies of the 3PP 
published in eight top communication journals between 1993 
and 2007. More than three-quarters of the articles used the 
subtractive approach to represent the 3PP. While all but four 
groups influences affects perceptions has been shown to be 
malleable. For example, in a study of the perceived effects 
of Internet pornography, Tewksbury (2002) found that the 
3PP increased when the size of the comparison group was 
larger. Shen et al.’s (2015) study, which used reality television, 
Internet pornography, and pro-social PSAs, found assimila-
tion priming (asking people to name similarities between 
themselves and the average person) reduced the size of the 
3PP, while contrast priming (asking people to name differ-
ences) increased it.
Alternatives interpretations have been proposed, such as 
Eveland et al. (1999), who provided evidence that a different 
process is at work. They indicate that individuals may invoke 
judgments about the perceived exposure of these comparison 
groups to the content in question. They then reason that the 
more exposed individuals in a given 3PP comparison group 
are to the content, the more affected they are perceived to 
be. Their results, which focused on rap and death metal 
music lyrics, showed that these exposure judgments account-
ed for quite a bit of the variance (relative to the size of per-
ceived social differences) in the social distance comparison 
groups. This finding was corroborated by several subsequent 
studies (Lambe & McLeod, 2005; Meirick, 2005; and Wu & 
Koo, 2001).
Reid and Hogg (2005) found that both of these mecha-
nisms might be at work in that the “normative fit” (similar 
to the perceived likelihood of exposure) of content (in this 
case, tabloid and print news and TV sitcoms) for a particular 
comparison group was a necessary condition for the social 
distance corollary to occur. For instance, a group that is seen 
as not likely to use the content in question is not likely to be 
seen as being affected by that type of content, even when 
their distance might yield ego-enhancing potential.
Different approaches to measuring the 3PP. 
Boyle, Schmierbach, and McLeod (2013) note that when 
the 3PP is the outcome variable for research, the methods 
used to study the perception are relatively inconsequential. 
In fact, copious research has demonstrated that the 3PP is a 
robust finding regardless of the negative media in question 
and regardless of how the differential is measured. However, 
these researchers note that when the 3PP is used as a predic-
tor of various consequences, its measurement becomes more 
consequential. In the following section, research on the con-
sequences of the 3PP will be addressed in more detail. For 
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were seen as more affected by rap lyrics condemning violence 
and misogyny toward women. In other research, a 1PP has 
emerged for positive messages. Lin (2013a) found that indi-
viduals thought that they were more positively affected by 
watching the environmental documentary, “An Inconvenient 
Truth,” than other people. Leung and Lo (2015) observed 
3PP for both anti- and pro-drug use online messages. Lin’s 
(2013b) study of online gamers found 1PPs for the positive 
effects of playing games online. Schmierbach, Boyle, Xu, 
and McLeod (2011) found evidence of a 1PP for the positive 
effects of playing video games, especially among heavy game 
players.
Elder, Douglas, and Sutton (2006) examined the relation-
ship between social distance and 1PPs and 3PPs. While per-
ceived effects on self were lower for both positive and 
negative media messages (i.e., supporting a 3PP), in-group 
and out-group differences were consistent with expectations. 
For negative media effects, out-groups were seen as more 
affected, but for positive messages, the in-group was seen as 
being more affected.
Most 3PP research problematically assumes that message 
content is inherently positive or negative. Some media con-
tent may have both positive and negative consequences (e.g., 
movies). Other content (e.g., video games) may be seen as 
having positive effects by some people and negative effects 
by other people. Moreover, as one might expect in the case 
of the example of anti-drug messages, moderators may play 
a big role in determining whether 3PPs or 1PPs are observed. 
For example, we might expect that younger adults with more 
countercultural attitudes about drug use would exhibit a 3PP, 
while older adults who may be less open to drug legalization 
to exhibit a 1PP. Given these factors that complicate assump-
tions about whether the content in question is universally 
positive or negative, it may be necessary to measure each 
respondent’s perception of message desirability rather than 
simply to assume it to be universally positive or negative 
(Eveland & McLeod, 1999).
More research is needed to clarify the inconsistent results 
concerning effects perceptions for positive messages. It does 
seem that when findings exhibit either the 1PP or 3PP, the 
differential is not as large as it is for the 3PP for negative 
messages (Eveland & McLeod, 1999). However, future re-
search could help to identify the conditions that lead positive 
messages to produce either a 3PP or a 1PP. For example, we 
might expect that simple prosocial messages (e.g., hand-
washing) may lead to a 3PP (i.e., “I do that already”), whereas 
of these 3PE articles used the subtractive approach, only 12 
of them used only the subtractive approach. The other articles 
employed several alternative approaches, including the dia-
mond model. Overall, Boyle, Schmierbach, and McLeod 
(2013) identified four approaches to testing the relationship 
between 3PP and its consequences: 1) the subtractive only 
approach; 2) separate measures of effects on self and others; 
3) the subtractive approach controlling for effects on self (or 
a related, but previously untested model controlling for effects 
on others); and 4) the diamond model. They compared these 
models by applying each of them to two previously published 
data sets (McLeod, Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997 and Eveland 
et al., 1999). Their conclusion was that each model offers its 
own unique insights based on the different way that it con-
ceptualizes effects perceptions. Future research should sys-
tematically investigate each of these models in order to 
provide a complete picture of what is going on.
Message desirability.
While much of the attention of 3PP research has focused 
on concerns about the effects of potential harmful forms of 
mediated communication (i.e., socially undesirable mes-
sages), a considerable amount of research has examined ques-
tions regarding what happens when the content in question 
has positive effects (i.e., socially desirable messages). Do 
people still see others as more affected by positive messages? 
Or does the 3PP reverse to a first-person perception (1PP) in 
which people see themselves as being more affected? For 
potentially undesirable messages, it is clear that seeing one-
self as being less affected than others would be ego-enhanc-
ing, but for positive messages, it is more complicated. When 
a message is positive (e.g., a PSA designed to prevent drug 
use), would it be more ego-enhancing to be less easily ma-
nipulated by media messages or to be more affected in the 
socially desirable direction? Given such contradictory theo-
retical expectations, it is not surprising that the results for 
positive messages have not been nearly as clear cut as those 
for negative messages.
Indeed, research has provided support for both the 3PP 
and the 1PP for positive messages. For example, Mackert et 
al. (2014) found a 3PP among hospital workers regarding the 
effects of hospital posters promoting frequent hand washing. 
Pariera (2015) found a 3PP gap for sex education, in which 
other people were seen as being more positively affected than 
the self. Eveland and McLeod (1999) found that other people 
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recipients of potentially negative media messages. Political 
attack ads were perceived to have a greater effect when con-
veyed by conventional media as opposed to online media 
(Wei & Lo, 2007). Given the virtually infinite characteristics 
of any given type of content, and the variety of different types 
of content that have lent themselves to perceived effects re-
search, it seems that research on content moderators has only 
scratched the surface of potential inquiry.
Content usage.
The extent to which an individual uses content is also 
important as heavy users may downplay harmful effects on 
self and others (Lo, Wei, & Wu, 2010; Wei & Lo, 2013; 
Zhong, 2009). Schmierbach et al. (2011) found that the 
amount of video game playing reduces the size of the 3PP. 
Interestingly, heavy game players simultaneously acknowl-
edged effects on themselves, but deny negative effects on the 
larger public suggesting an influence of perceived exposure 
judgments. Frequency of game playing was associated with 
greater perception of positive effects, but lower perceptions 
of negative effects.
Demographic factors.
There have been several studies that have examined gen-
der differences in effects perceptions—both differences be-
tween the effects judgments of men and women and 
differences in terms of the gender of the effects target group. 
Lewis, Watson, and Tay (2007) found different effects of 
anti-speeding and anti-drunk driving advertisements—wom-
en felt they were more affected than others, while men ex-
hibited the 3PP. Reid et al. (2007) observed that respondent 
gender was the largest factor in predicting the 3PP for the 
perceived effects of pornography. Men reported themselves 
and other men to be more positively affected, while women 
reported themselves and other women to be more negatively 
affected. Similarly, Wei, and Lo (2013) observed that girls 
were perceived to be more negatively affected by sexting than 
boys.
The age of both the respondent and of the effects target 
group have been important factors. Henrikson and Flora 
(1999) found that children exhibit a particularly strong self-
serving bias, with clear 3PP for cigarette ads and 1PP for 
anti-smoking ads. Scharrer and Leone (2006) surveyed mid-
dle school children about perceived effects of video games 
more complex messages (e.g., vaccinations) might lead to a 
1PP (i.e., “I can understand why that is important”). We 
might also expect messages correcting bad behavior (e.g., 
anti-violence messages) to be associated with 3PPs (i.e., “I 
don’t have that problem”), while messages promoting altru-
istic behaviors (e.g., giving to charity) to fit the 1PP pattern 
(i.e., “I am a good person”). In addition, as Golan and Day 
(2008) note, more research is needed on 3PP and 1PP for 
pro-social messages and their behavioral consequences.
Perception moderators.
The roughly 200 studies related to the 3PP have identified 
a large number of moderating factors that can influence the 
size of the 3PP including content and usage factors, audience 
demographic, knowledge, and predispositional factors, and 
geographic factors.
Content factors.
When assessing the perceived effects of content on self 
and others, it seems rather obvious that the type of content 
would make a difference. What is somewhat surprising is 
that the 3PP has been found for so many different types of 
content. The single most important dimension across these 
studies seems to be whether the content is seen as having 
positive or negative consequences (often referred to as the 
social desirability). As noted above, content that is perceived 
as being harmful tends to produce a 3PP, while content per-
ceived as positive has less consistent effects. Beyond the 
positive/negative distinction in social desirability, the degree 
of negative or positivity should also make a difference. For 
example, Zhong (2009) found that the perceived social desir-
ability of online video game content reduced the size of the 
3PP.
A host of other content factors have been shown to influ-
ence 3PP. The size of 3PPs was influenced by the choice of 
news frames used in stories about the Clinton-Lewinsky 
scandal (Joslyn, 2003). Falces, Bautista, and Sierra (2011) 
conducted an experiment in which they manipulated the 
argument quality for a health campaign message. Results 
exhibited a 3PP pattern in the weak message condition, but 
a 1PP pattern in the strong message condition. Chung, 
Munno, and Moritz (2015) found that reader comments fol-
lowing an online news story reduced the 3PP, perhaps be-
cause it draws attention to the fact that others are not passive 
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specialized knowledge and exposure to alternative informa-
tion sources enhanced their ability to resist the harmful ef-
fects of mainstream media.
Predispositions.
There are many predispositions that potentially moderate 
3PPs. For example, Mutz (1989) found that the perceived 
importance of the issue was associated with a wider 3PP gap. 
Lo et al. (2015) found that both perceived issue importance 
and cognitive elaboration reduced the size of the 3PP for the 
impact of news coverage in spreading fear about imported 
American beef in Taiwan. Zhao and Cai (2008) observed 
that a positive self-image was linked to wider 3PPs for Inter-
net pornography. Political ideology is one of the most com-
monly examined predispositions. Banning (2006) found 
larger 3PP for Republicans than Democrats for effects of 
election news coverage. Winslow and Napier (2012) extend-
ed the 3PP logic to examine the perceived effects of same-sex 
marriage legalization. While there was a general tendency 
to see other people’s attitudes about marriage and sexuality 
as being more affected than one’s own, the differential was 
greatest among right-wing authoritarians.
Geographic factors.
Comparative studies have shown some differences in per-
ceived effects. For example, Hong (2015) compared 3PP for 
violent video games between respondents in the United States 
and South Korea, finding evidence of the 3PP in both coun-
tries, but the gap was larger in the United States. Using a 
unique approach to studying effects perceptions, Muller’s 
(2013) content analysis revealed that U.S. and German news-
paper coverage of elections fits the 3PP pattern. German 
stories portrayed U.S. media as having a greater impact on 
elections than German media, and vice versa for U.S. media.
Consequences of 3PP (3PE). 
While the 3PP is an interesting robust perceptual phe-
nomenon, its significance is somewhat negligible all by itself. 
What makes it important is the fact that it seems to be re-
lated to various consequential opinions such as support for 
policies to restrict content. Though research on the conse-
quences of the 3PP has not been as common (nor as consis-
tent) as research on the perception itself (Boyle, Schmierbach, 
and found that the 3PP was larger for games that had more 
restrictive ratings and when the 3PP comparison group was 
younger. Eveland et al. (1999) showed that the perceived 
effects of violent and misogynistic rap and death metal mu-
sic increased markedly when comparison groups were young-
er.
Parallel to findings for age, perceived effects on others 
decreases as the level of education of the 3PP comparison 
groups increases (Eveland et al., 1999; Peiser & Peter, 2000). 
Several studies have shown respondents’ education level is 
associated with wider 3PPs (Tiedge et al., 1991; Willnat, 
1996).
Knowledge.
As moderators, knowledge and expertise moderate the 
3PP in three different ways: 1) through perceptions of the 
knowledge of the “other” group, 2) through an individual’s 
perception of their own knowledge/expertise, and 3) through 
an individual’s actual knowledge/expertise relevant to the 
effect in question. The level of perceived expertise of the 3PP 
comparison group about which effects judgments are being 
made, reduces the level of perceived effects (Jung & Jo, 2013). 
Similarly, perceived effects have been found to be greater on 
less educated groups (Eveland et al., 1999). The interpretation 
of these findings is that individuals perceive that less knowl-
edgeable, less educated others are less able to protect them-
selves against harmful media effects. 
Research has examined both the moderating influence 
of both the research participant’s perceived level of his/her 
own knowledge, as well as whether they have relevant ex-
pertise. For example, Lasorsa (1989) found that one’s per-
ceived political expertise was associated with greater TPPs 
regarding the effects of the cold-war-inspired TV mini-series, 
“Amerika,” but an objective measure of political knowledge 
was not. While the perception that one is relatively knowl-
edgeable would naturally be linked to the ego-defensive na-
ture of TPPs, the significance of actual expertise may be 
more complicated as evidenced by Huh and Langteau’s 
(2007) survey. This survey found doctors had smaller 3PPs 
and consumer experts had larger 3PPs than the general pub-
lic when considering the effects of DTC advertisements for 
prescription drugs. Rauch (2010) used qualitative interviews 
to explore the relative perceptions of invulnerability ex-
pressed by activists in regard to the effects of mainstream 
news coverage. The activists expressed the belief that their 
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(2012) study of attitudes toward movies with homosexual 
characters in Singapore failed to find a link between 3PP and 
support for censorship. Paradise and Sullivan (2012) failed 
to find a relationship between perceived negative effects of 
Facebook and support for greater regulation.
Other content restrictions. 
Several studies have extended the logic used to connect 
the 3PP to censorship to show that it predicts other forms of 
content restrictions and sanctions. Leung and Lo’s (2015) 
survey in Hong Kong revealed significant relationships be-
tween the 3PP for online pro-drug use messages (the gap for 
pro-social, anti-drug messages was unrelated to support for 
rectifying measures) and three forms of policy options: re-
strictive, corrective and counter-promotional measures. Wei 
et al.’s (2015) analysis of survey data regarding reactions to 
Taiwanese coverage of the Fukushima nuclear incident 
showed that the 3PP was related to behavioral intentions to 
support self-protection, corrective actions, and public educa-
tion. Gunther’s (1991) study of the perceived effects of a 
defamatory news story failed to find a linkage to support for 
punitive damages against the newspaper.
Several studies have looked at the implications of 3PPs 
in the context of political elections. Some of these studies 
reveal linkages between 3PPs and support for election-relat-
ed content policies including election news coverage restric-
tions (Salwen, 1998), poll-reporting restrictions (Wei, Chia, 
& Lo, 2011), and election night projections restrictions (Price 
& Stroud, 2006). Wei and Lo (2007) found a link to restric-
tions on political attack ads, but only for perceived effects 
on others and not the 3PP.
Willingness to speak out.
Several studies have demonstrated that the 3PP can affect 
willingness to speak out. Mutz (1989) found that the 3PP was 
associated with greater willingness to join discussions and 
sign petitions on the issue of divestment in apartheid South 
Africa. Similarly, Willnat (1996) corroborated the linkage 
between the 3PP and willingness to speak out on a topic, 
though the effect was mediated through the 3PP’s relation-
ship to the public opinion climate and moderated by percep-
tions of issue importance. Wei, Chia, and Lo (2011) linked 
3PP to willingness to engage in campaign discussions.
& McLeod, 2013), there is consensus among researchers that 
it is this “influence of this perceived influence” that makes 
3PP an important area of inquiry. Moreover, while research 
has demonstrated linkages between effects perceptions and 
various consequences, there are still questions about wheth-
er the consequences are the result of the 3PP gap (McLeod, 
Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997) or of the more simple size of 
perceived effects on others (Salwen, 1998; Gunther & Storey, 
2003).
Censorship.
The most commonly observed outcome variable of the 
3PP is support for censorship of potentially harmful media 
content (Boyle, Schmierbach, & McLeod. 2013). The 3PP 
has been linked to the support of the censorship of pornog-
raphy (Gunther, 1995; Rojas, Shah, & Faber, 1996; Zhao & 
Cai, 2008), sex and violence in TV programming (Gunther 
& Hwa, 1996; Rojas, Shah, & Faber, 1996), ads promoting 
gambling (Youn, Faber, & Shah, 2000), violent video games 
(Hong, 2015), and rap and death metal music (McLeod, 
Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997).
Other studies have sought to refine the relationship be-
tween the 3PP and censorship in various ways. In examining 
the perceived effects gap for TV violence, Hoffner et al. (1999) 
differentiated between effects on scary world perceptions 
and on aggression. Only the latter was related to support for 
the censorship of TV violence. Chia, Lu, and McLeod’s 
(2004) study of the relationship between 3PP and censorship 
in the context of the Taiwanese government’s efforts to sup-
press the distribution of a controversial sex scandal video 
was driven more by the desire to punish the offending dis-
tributor rather than to protect the public from exposure. Sun, 
Shen, and Pan (2008) showed that the 3PP was linked to a 
desire to restrict negative content, while a 1PP differential 
was associated with the desire to amplify positive messages. 
McLeod, Eveland, and Nathanson (1997) propose that a 
paternalistic orientation leads those who perceive others to 
be more affected to advocate censorship of the problematic 
content. Those who serve as censors willingly expose them-
selves to potentially harmful content in order to make deci-
sions that would protect others. Unless they are inherently 
masochistic, censors must then believe that they are to some 
degree immune to the content effects that would harm others.
Some studies have failed to find a linkage between the 
3PP and support for censorship. For example, Ho et al.’s 
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perceived effects across different types of content and across 
studies. For what types of media and what types of content 
do people have the most concern about harmful effects? Un-
der what content context do 3PPs seem to be largest? Are 
there differences in the predictors of 3PPs for different media? 
When it comes to pro-social media, given the mixed nature 
of findings to date, researchers could probably go further in 
specifying conditions under which we see 3PP and 1PP pat-
terns.
Though Price and Tewksbury (1996) conclude that the 
3PP is not a methodological artifact of factors like question 
proximity and ordering, some researchers have suggested 
that there are some methodological limitations of the 3PP. 
Banning (2001) found that 3PP phenomena are less promi-
nent in the real world than when measured in surveys and 
controlled experiments. Moreover, one meta-analysis (Paul, 
Salwen, & Dupagne, 2000) found the 3PP was reduced in 
non-student and random samples. These studies point to the 
need for more research to investigate the nature of the rela-
tionship between 3PP research findings and the techniques 
used to find them.
Some 3PP research has gone beyond general questions 
about the amount of harmful or beneficial impacts that com-
munication has on self and others to look at more specific 
assessments of the nature of effects. For example, when Sal-
wen and Dupagne (1999) differentiated between general ef-
fects and immorality effects, they observed that different 
types of perceived effects linked to support for content restric-
tions from one content context to another. Pronin, Berger, 
and Molouki (2007) examined a variant of the 3PP by ex-
amining estimations of self and others’ susceptibility to social 
influences that induce different types of conformity (e.g., 
political views and consumer purchases). Given that com-
munication researchers have studied many different types 
of communication effects, it is somewhat surprising that so 
few studies have gone beyond the general questions of effects 
to look at more specific types of effects.
Above we noted many different explanations that schol-
ars have proposed to account for the 3PP. While some re-
searchers have begun to sort these explanations out, more 
work is needed. Most of the efforts so far have sought to 
empirically measure factors related to different explanations 
(e.g., see Eveland et al., 1999, who measured perceived social 
distance and perceived likelihood of exposure). Other re-
searchers may want to follow the example of Rauch (2010) 
to do more qualitative, in-depth interviews to more deeply 
Voting.
Cohen and Tsfati (2009) found that voting behaviors were 
influenced by perceptions of news coverage influence on 
others’ voting behaviors. Similarly, Golan, Banning, and 
Lundy (2008) uncovered that 3PP regarding the effects of 
political advertising motivated respondents to vote in order 
to compensate for others’ gullibility.
Self-protective behaviors.
Tewksbury, Moy, and Weis (2004) examined 3PP conse-
quences in the context of the Y2K computer bug that some 
prognosticators thought would adversely affect computers 
on January 1, 2000. Respondents were motivated to take 
protective actions like buying extra food, water and gasoline 
out of concern that other people would panic due to media 
coverage of the Y2K bug, thus creating temporary shortages. 
Other studies showed that the 3PP may discourage protective 
actions. The 3PP was associated with lower behavioral inten-
tions to take protective actions regarding the spread of disease 
(Liu & Lo, 2014), which may in part be a function of opti-
mistic bias and in part a function of the fact people are more 
motivated to engage in protective health behaviors out of 
concern for their own health as opposed to protecting the 
health of the community at large. In another study, parents 
who thought their children were less affected than other 
people’s children were less likely to engage in parental mon-
itoring of their children’s exposure to potentially harmful 
media (Tsfati, Ribak, & Cohen, 2005).
Body image behaviors.
Chia’s (2007) survey of college women in Singapore ex-
amined the impact of perceived effects of the thinness norms 
perpetrated by advertising. Respondents who reported strong 
effects on self and others were more likely to engage in 
weight-loss efforts, while those who exhibited the largest 
3PPs were less likely to do so.
Future directions for 3PP research. 
Researchers have identified numerous media content 
contexts in which 3PPs can be observed. While some studies 
have looked at different content contexts within the same 
study, there have been few attempts to specify differences in 
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In this model, we can see that these areas are not isolated, 
but are very much interrelated. Perceptions of credibility/
trust are related to perceptions of media bias. In turn, both 
sets of judgments may lead to the development of media ef-
fects perceptions. For example, the HMP is linked to the 
perceived effects of such bias (e.g., the PPI). Moreover, these 
media perceptions may involve common perceptual pro-
cesses (e.g., assimilation and contrast,  and self-serving bi-
ases). 
It is also hoped that this model will help clarify and uni-
fy related terminology such that it will be used in a more 
precise way in the future. For example, since Davison (1983) 
originally coined the term, “Third-person Effect,” research-
ers have used it to cover both the perception gap and its 
consequences. But the literature does not treat the percep-
tual gap as an effect at all. To be sure, the gap is an outcome 
of the aforementioned psychological processes, but research 
uses it as an antecedent rather than as an outcome (often 
assuming but not testing a causal relationship to its conse-
quences). For clarity’s sake, it is useful to refer to the gap as 
the “third-person perception” and its related attitudinal and 
behavioral consequences (e.g., support for censorship) as 
“third-person effects.” A related problem is that 3PEs often 
get referred to as the “behavioral component” of the 3PP, 
which is often a misnomer as many of the most common 3PE 
measures (e.g., support for censorship) are not behaviors at 
all, but attitudes (i.e., attitudes toward the acceptability of 
censorship). These labels can be extended to other areas of 
perception research to distinguish perception and conse-
quences (e.g., HMP and HME). That said, it is probably also 
important for future research to investigate causal linkages 
between the perceptions and the so-called effects.
This model also identifies some areas of media perception 
research that have not been studied systematically. For in-
stance, there are many media perceptions that are currently 
represented in the model by the term “Other Content Percep-
tions.” In 3PP research, researchers call on respondents to 
employ perceptions of entertainment media (e.g., perceptions 
of sex and violence in content) that are implicitly used to 
generate effects perceptions. These types of media percep-
tions and enumerable other types of media perceptions could 
be examined more explicitly and linked to their potential 
consequences.
Similarly, perception research for news media could be 
expanded beyond trust, credibility, and bias. For example, 
news media perception research could engage in more 
explore how people derive their judgments about media ef-
fects.
Researchers have been interested in the extent to which 
knowledge and expertise influence 3PP phenomenon. But 
at best, the role of expertise remains unclear as important 
questions remain. Does expertise increase or shrink the 3PP? 
Does any observed difference in the 3PP result from differ-
ences in perceived effects on self or on others? Given that the 
nature of expertise varies markedly from one effects context 
to the next, we have only scratched the surface with regard 
to its relationship to the 3PP phenomenon.
Researchers should continue to seek out new domains of 
3PP consequences beyond the commonly used support for 
censorship and willingness to speak out. Moreover, this re-
search on 3PP consequences should follow the advice of 
Boyle, Schmierbach, and McLeod (2013) and employ each 
of the four models they identify to contribute to a more nu-
anced understanding of the perception antecedents of 3PE 
consequences. It is possible that different perceptual compo-
nents link to different types of consequences, which begs for 
more systematic explorations.
As noted above, there is some disagreement in the litera-
ture as to whether the 3PP is the result of an overestimation 
of effects on others or an under-estimation of effects on one-
self. But the generally low levels of perceived media effects 
on ourselves that have been observed across media content 
contexts is a broad indication that people are relatively un-
concerned about such effects. This unwillingness to admit 
the effects on oneself may cause individuals to let down their 
guards making them more vulnerable to media effects. It 
may lead individuals to over-saturating themselves with 
screen time, exposing themselves to harmful messages (such 
as violent movies and video games), and even underestimat-
ing the vast amount of time they spend with media. 
Conclusion
In this article, we have provided a conceptual model that 
links the various areas of media perceptions research (see 
Figure 1). This model separates bodies of research into those 
that examine media perceptions (i.e., trust/credibility percep-
tions and the HMP) and those that focus on perceptions of 
media effects (i.e., theories of Presumed Influence such as 
the PPI and 3PP). Each of these areas focuses on either the 
perception itself, the consequences of the perception, or both. 
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detailed explorations of public perceptions of normative ex-
pectations for the press (Gurevitch & Blumler, 1990), as well 
as perceptions of how well news media performance lives up 
to those expectations. Perceptions of news media ethics 
might constitute another area for systematic perception re-
search. In each of these areas, media perceptions could be 
linked to their potential consequences (effects). Media per-
ception research could also do more to include Uses and 
Gratifications research (both for news and for entertainment 
media). After all, there is copious research looking at how 
people perceive media as meeting different gratifications 
sought (Rubin, 2009). Choices about media use, for example, 
could be conceptualized as an outcome of uses and gratifica-
tions perceptions, which are also interrelated to perceptions 
of trust/credibility and bias (Tsfati, 2014).
Because perceived media effects on others may influence 
individuals’ behaviors, it is important to ensure that such 
effects are not perceived simply because researchers asked 
respondents to indicate whether media have effects on the 
audience. In other words, when unprompted, do people see 
media messages and assume they influence others? The Per-
suasive Press Inference provides support for the premise that 
individuals do believe media affect others, even when they 
are not directly asked by researchers. PPI studies have dem-
onstrated that when shown news messages with different 
valences, estimates of public opinion vary along with the 
perceived valence of the news content — especially when 
individuals believe others have been exposed to those mes-
sages. These findings are important in establishing that in-
dividuals believe that the media content that other people 
are exposed to can influence what those others are thinking 
and doing. More research on the PPI is needed to help estab-
lish that when individuals are not research respondents, they 
truly do perceive media as affecting others.
There is also work to be done to differentiate perceived 
media influence from perceived media effects. This is primar-
ily an issue of measurement, with some research on 3PE and 
PPI probing a general sense of perceived media influence 
(e.g., To what extent would this media content influence 
others?), and other research using items that directly link 
perceived media influence to its perceived effects (e.g., To 
what extent would this media content influence others to 
think violent thoughts?). The former method leaves open the 
question of what sorts of effects might emerge from perceived 
media influence. The latter method better captures the spe-
cific perceived effects of media content, but does so at the 
expense of possibly alerting the respondent to a media effect 
they may not have considered on their own. Alternatively, 
some researchers measure both perceived media influence 
(e.g., How much are others influenced by cigarette ads?) and 
perceptions of what others are doing or thinking (e.g., What 
percentage of the public smokes?), then look at the relation-
ship between the two items. In other words, the researchers 
are trying to gauge whether the respondent believes that more 
people are smoking due to the influence of cigarette ads. This 
tactic invites questions of causality, as perceptions of what 
others are doing or thinking can be impacted by many other 
factors beyond perceived media influence. While there are 
pros and cons to each measurement strategy, future research 
should address the implications of the varying operational-
izations.
In attempting to tie together research findings regarding 
media perceptions and perception effects, a major obstacle 
is parsing the different levels at which study subjects are 
asked to evaluate the media. For example, studies of news 
media perceptions may ask about individual news stories or 
programs, specific journalists or media personalities, differ-
ent media organizations or media types, or about the press 
as a monolith. Different factors can be at play in shaping the 
perceptions of each, and the consequences of those percep-
tions may vary as well. Investigating the antecedents and 
consequences related to different levels of media percpetions 
is certainly an area ripe for further exploration. Addition-
ally, when researchers ask participants to discuss their per-
ceptions of media (particularly broad classes, such as the 
press, the mainstream media, the Internet, television, and 
newspapers), a number of factors come into play to shape 
what each respondent considers to be part of that class. That 
is, the object about which respondents are providing opinions 
may vary from one respondent to the next, perhaps in sys-
tematic ways, even though each is asked the same question. 
Studies would do well to include more specific question 
wording to help ensure respondents are providing answers 
about what the researchers are interested in, or to ask follow-
up questions to understand how respondents interpret terms 
about which they are queried.
The vast majority of research concerning media percep-
tions has involved participants providing self-reports through 
survey questionnaires. Other techniques such as neurology, 
physiology, and coding facial expressions could be helpful 
in uncovering processes at play that self-reports may not 
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search in the area of media perceptions is not there yet. A 
majority of the existing research on media perceptions and 
perceived media effects has been conducted by American 
researchers. And though there have many studies conducted 
elsewhere, in Europe and Asia in particular, there has been 
virtually no comparative research that has sought to iden-
tify differences in media perceptions research between dif-
ferent social systems, much less research that has examined 
factors that might account for such differences. Moreover, 
the studies we have reviewed have shown remarkable con-
sistency from one national context to another. For research 
in this area to move forward, it is time for researchers to 
examine frameworks for comparative research, such as that 
provided by Esser and Hanitzsch (2012), and begin the pro-
cess of bringing the various strands of media perception re-
search up to speed as far as comparative understandings. 
In summary, the research in the areas that we have cov-
ered in this review has been plentiful, indicating that re-
searchers find these areas important. The growing scope of 
international research on media perceptions is encouraging, 
but must adopt more comparative approaches in order to 
broaden our understanding of how different cultural orienta-
tions and varying political, economic, and media systems 
shape perceptions of media and media effects, and the effects 
such perceptions have. Given all the research that has been 
done to date, it is important to note that, rather than slowing 
down, the rate of research continues to grow (Table 1) and 
our theoretical understanding of these phenomena continues 
to expand. In this review, we not only integrate these areas 
into a conceptual model (Figure 1) according to their paral-
lels and relationships to each other, but we also suggest nu-
merous directions where future research would be fruitful.
capture. Indeed, physiological research has shown people 
pay more attention to bad news (Grabe & Kamhawi, 2006), 
or negative news (Zillmann et al., 2004). Might we expect 
similar findings with respect to counterattitudinal news or 
with news perceived as hostile?
A final angle that offers tremendous potential for theo-
retical growth and future research follows the directive from 
Blumler, McLeod, and Rosengren (1992) that comparative 
research offers a vast new frontier for communication re-
search. And while this observation holds generally across 
the various areas of mass communication, it is particularly 
true for media perceptions research. Given that media sys-
tems and mass-mediated messages differ markedly from one 
system to the next, it is reasonable to assume that we might 
observe important differences in media perception phenom-
ena from one country to the next. Moreover, there are numer-
ous cultural factors that differentiate the individuals doing 
the perceiving from one culture to the next that might also 
give rise to differences in media perceptions. Esser and Ha-
nitzsch (2012) argue that the field of mass communication 
has exhibited “remarkable progress” in the two decades since 
Blumler et al.’s (1992) call for comparative research. In the 
introduction of their edited volume, in summarizing develop-
ments in various areas of comparative communication re-
search, they note, “In more and more subfields of the 
communication discipline, comparative research is moving 
from description to explanation, from simplification to the-
oretical sophistication, from accidental choice of cases to 
their systematic selection, and from often anecdotal evidence 
to methodological rigor. These advancements clearly speak 
to the rich potential of the comparative approach to inaugu-
rating new lines in communication research.” (p. 3) Despite 
this optimistic outlook on the field of communication, re-
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